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Abstract
This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for a
strategic timing problem, where two firms have the (real) option to invest irreversibly
in some market. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The
analysis of the problem emphasizes its dynamic nature and exploits only its economic
structure. In particular, the determination of equilibria with preemption is reduced to
solving a single class of constrained stopping problems. The general results are applied to
typical state-space models from the literature, to point out common deficits in equilibrium
arguments and to suggest alternative equilibria that are Pareto improvements.
Keywords: Preemption, real options, irreversible investment, equilibrium, optimal stop-
ping.
JEL subject classification: C61, C73, D21, D43, L12, L13
1 Introduction
Preemption is a well-known phenomenon in the context of irreversible investment. In their
seminal paper, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) argue that the commitment power of irreversibil-
ity and subgame-perfectness together imply that any firm which is the first to adopt a new
technology in some industry can deter adoption by another firm; the benefits from adoption
for the second firm will already be reduced by competition and thus not worth the immediate
adoption cost. In consequence, the firms try to preempt each other to secure the (temporary)
monopoly profit.1
Such preemption is particularly interesting when it is costly. In their deterministic model,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) assume that the adoption cost decreases over time, which gener-
ates an incentive to delay adoption and thus a conflict with the preemption impulse. Another
possibility is to introduce uncertainty, so that the real-option effect would induce the firms to
wait for an optimal adoption time. There is already a sizable literature on similar real-option
games, aiming to identify a drastic impact of competition on the valuation of real options and
most of it using principles as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
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1This effect does not appear in simple Nash equilibria as studied by Reinganum (1981), where firms pre-
commit to adoption times.
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With uncertainty, the analysis of the models changes, which typically causes some problems
to be addressed in this paper. The standard model of uncertainty in the literature on real
options is a Markovian shock process (most frequently its growth rates follow a Brownian
motion), such that it is natural to work with value functions and also strategies as functions
of the state space. However, the stochastic state does not evolve linearly like time in general,
so one needs to be careful when borrowing arguments from deterministic models. Indeed,
many arguments in the existing literature rely on analytic properties of value functions and
often remain incomplete or obscure, because they mask the dynamic nature of the involved
problems and partly neglect the inherent economic structure.
In the following, a general model of preemptive investment under uncertainty based on
revenue streams is proposed and used to establish important principles for subgame-perfect
equilibria. The analysis only uses arguments in terms of comparing revenue streams, which
thus have a direct economic meaning, but which are fully formal at the same time. In a first
step, the determination of subgame-perfect equilibria with preemption is reduced to solving
a single class of constrained optimal stopping problems. Then some verification problems for
alternative equilibria avoiding preemption are formulated.
Alongside, important general questions for equilibria of real-option games are addressed,
such as:
• At what times is there a first-mover advantage for both firms that they fight for by
trying to preempt each other?
• Does anyone want to stop and invest as leader to escape expected preemption at a later
point in time?
• In particular, is it always optimal to wait while one has a second-mover advantage?
• If someone takes the lead, when and how is that decision affected by a threat of pre-
emption?
Answers to these question will be found by studying appropriate optimal stopping problems.
Afterwards, the general principles will be applied to two typical state-space models from
the literature, those of Grenadier (1996) and Pawlina and Kort (2006), to point out that
commonly not all relevant stopping problems are considered for equilibrium verification in
similar models, and to actually provide complete subgame-perfect equilibria. We further
identify and analyze additional equilibria, some Pareto dominating the equilibrium outcomes
proposed in the original papers.
More generally, some examples that are covered by the present general model are the
deterministic ones of Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), the stochastic
model of Mason and Weeds (2010), where revenue is linear in a geometric Brownian motion,
as in the model of Pawlina and Kort (2006), who add asymmetry in investment costs, which is
further extended to an exponential Lévy process by Boyarchenko and Levendorski˘ı (2014); the
model of Weeds (2002) additionally includes Poisson arrivals of R&D success and the model
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of Grenadier (1996) includes a construction delay, but they are both formally equivalent to a
symmetric setting with geometric Brownian motion again.
The paper is organized as follows. The general model is presented in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes equilibria with and without preemption, first providing some equilibrium
verification problems and then identifying conditions when investment cannot be delayed in
equilibrium. Different versions of the problem when to become optimally the leader play a
key role therein. The applications in Section 4 first illustrate how the general results solve
common equilibrium verification issues in the literature. Then additional equilibrium effects
neglected by the literature are studied. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains some
technical results and most proofs.
2 Strategic investment timing problem
Consider two firms i ∈ {1, 2} that both have the possibility to make an irreversible investment
in the same market, either to enter the market or to improve their operations if they are already
present (e.g., technology or production capacity). Before any investment occurs, each firm i
earns a discounted revenue stream given by the stochastic process (pi0it )t≥0. If firm i is the
first to invest, it switches to a new revenue stream, net of (capitalized) investment costs, given
by the stochastic process (piLit )t≥0. Firm i’s investment potentially also affects the revenue
stream of the other firm j ∈ {1, 2} \ i, which switches to the process (piFjt )t≥0 as long as j has
not invested itself. Once both firms i = 1, 2 have invested, each finally earns a permanent net
revenue stream given by the process (piBit )t≥0.
To set the formal basis, all processes are assumed to be product-measurable w.r.t. a given
probability space
(
Ω,F , P
)
and continuous time t ∈ R+, and indeed P⊗dt-integrable to ensure
finite expectations throughout (i.e., E
[∫∞
0
∣∣pi0it ∣∣ dt] < ∞ and analogously for all others). All
revenue streams are further assumed to be adapted to a given filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying
the usual conditions2, which captures the dynamic information about the state of the world.
As a standing economic assumption, the following orders among the revenue processes
are imposed. To reflect a monopoly premium as long as some firm is the only one having
invested, let piLi· ≥ piBi· P ⊗dt-a.e., i = 1, 2. Correspondingly, to have also the first investment
by some firm rather harm the revenue of the other (e.g., due to business stealing), let pi0i· ≥ piFi·
P ⊗ dt-a.e., i = 1, 2. The important special case pi0i· ≡ piFi· would typically be assumed in
market entry models. Some of the subsequent results will be shown to become stronger and/or
simpler in that case.
Finally, firm 2 is allowed to be handicapped relative to firm 1 in the sense of smaller gains
over being laggard, letting piB2· − piF2· ≤ piB1· − piF1· and piL2· − piF2· ≤ piL1· − piF1· P ⊗ dt-a.e.
The disadvantage may stem, e.g., from a higher capitalized investment cost. Given the first
condition, i.e., that firm 2 has less to gain from a follow-up investment, the second condition
would be implied by the revenue loss due to an opponent’s follow-up investment, piLi· − piBi· ,
being higher for firm 1.
2That is, the filtration is right-continuous and complete.
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Both firms can decide when to invest in continuous time t ∈ R+ (or not at all), taking into
account information about the exogenous uncertainty and whether the respective other has
already invested or not. In particular, if the opponent of firm i ∈ {1, 2} is the first to invest
at time t ≥ 0, then firm i will decide when to follow optimally, to attain the follower value
F it =
∫ t
0
pi0is ds+ ess sup
τ≥t
E
[∫ τ
t
piFis ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] (2.1)
=
∫ t
0
pi0is ds+ E
[∫ τ iF (t)
t
piFis ds+
∫ ∞
τ
i
F (t)
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Ft].
The supremum is over all feasible timing rules τ , which are the F-stopping times. Let T
denote the set of all stopping times. The constraint τ ≥ t is understood to hold a.s., like all
(in-)equalities between random variables in the following. By continuity and integrability of
the process (
∫ ·
t pi
Fi
s ds+
∫∞
· pi
Bi
s ds) to be stopped, there exists a latest optimal (thus uniquely
defined) stopping time τ iF (t) ∈ T attaining the value F it .
Now suppose on the contrary that firm i is the first to invest at some time t. Then the
other firm j is assumed to follow suit at τ jF (t) to realize F
j
t , thus yielding i the instantaneous
expected leader payoff
Lit =
∫ t
0
pi0is ds+ E
[∫ τ jF (t)
t
piLis ds+
∫ ∞
τ
j
F (t)
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]. (2.2)
Finally, if both firms happen to invest simultaneously at time t, each firm i = 1, 2 realizes
M it =
∫ t
0
pi0is ds+ E
[∫ ∞
t
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ min{F it , Lit}. (2.3)
Note that if no firm invests in finite time, then each firm i earns
F i∞ = Li∞ = M i∞ =
∫ ∞
0
pi0is ds.
Remark 2.1 (Regularity of the payoff processes). Investment will typically occur at stopping
times, say ϑ ∈ T , not only inside the follower’s reaction problem (2.1), but also for the first
investor. Thus the relations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) should still hold if one replaces t by any
stopping time ϑ ∈ T . By Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1 there are indeed processes (Lit)t≥0,
(F it )t≥0 and (M it )t≥0, such that the value of each process at any ϑ ∈ T corresponds to the
right-hand side of (2.1), (2.2) or (2.3), respectively, if one replaces t by ϑ therein, where
τ jF (ϑ) ∈ T is still the latest stopping time attaining F jϑ. It is much more convenient to work
with payoff processes than families like {F iϑ |ϑ ∈ T }. Indeed, by Lemma A.1 we may assume
all payoff processes to be right-continuous and sufficiently integrable, precisely of class (D).3
3This ensures that each process, if evaluated at stopping times, is bounded in expectation and that pointwise
limits at stopping times induce the corresponding limits in expectation. All regularity properties are easier
to verify for M i, as it is the difference of the martingale (E[
∫∞
0 pi
Bi
s ds |Ft])t≥0 and the continuous process
(
∫ t
0 (pi
Bi
s − pi0is ) ds)t≥0.
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Since each firm’s investment timing also affects the respective other firm’s payoff, the
investment decisions are strategic. For instance, from the point of view of time t = 0, if firm
j plans to invest at the random time τ j ∈ T , then firm i faces the optimal stopping problem
sup
τ
i∈T
E
[
Li
τ
i1
τ
i
<τ
j + F i
τ
j1
τ
i
>τ
j +M i
τ
i1
τ
i=τ j
∣∣∣F0] (2.4)
= sup
τ
i≤τ j
E
[
Li
τ
i1
τ
i
<τ
j + F i
τ
j1
τ
i=τ j
∣∣∣F0].
Obviously firm i then can only consider to become leader before τ j ; otherwise it will (at most)
become follower at τ j . We will analyze the timing game between the players firm 1 and firm
2 of when to invest, played as long as no firm has invested; the first investment by some firm
settles the payoffs by the processes (Lit), (F it ) and (M it ).
3 Equilibrium characterization
The assumptions on the relation between the different revenue processes have important con-
sequences for equilibria of the timing game, independently of any more specific model for the
uncertainty. The aim of this section is to illuminate the structure of possible equilibria just
by comparing payoff streams. We will show that it suffices to solve one particular class of
constrained optimal stopping problems to construct subgame-perfect equilibria with preemp-
tion. Then some verification problems for equilibria avoiding preemption will be formulated.
Finally we will determine times when investment cannot be delayed in equilibrium.
The formal notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for timing games under uncertainty used
here is that of Riedel and Steg (2014). In particular, we consider arbitrary stopping times
ϑ ∈ T as the possible beginnings of subgames in which no firm has invested before. The
players’ strategies must form a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, independently of whether
it is actually reached by equilibrium play or not, and the strategies must be time consistent
across subgames. A pure strategy of player i in any subgame is a stopping time τ iϑ ≥ ϑ,
such that according to any pair of pure strategies, investment by some firm at min{τ1ϑ , τ2ϑ}
effectively terminates the game, with the corresponding expected payoffs
E
[
Li
τ
i
ϑ
1
τ
i
ϑ<τ
j
ϑ
+ F i
τ
j
ϑ
1
τ
i
ϑ>τ
j
ϑ
+M i
τ
i
ϑ
1
τ
i
ϑ=τ
j
ϑ
∣∣∣Fϑ]
at ϑ. Time consistency requires that a family of pure strategies
{
τ iϑ
∣∣ϑ ∈ T } satisfies τ iϑ = τ iϑ′
a.s. on the event {ϑ′ ≤ τ iϑ} for any two ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T .
All necessary equilibrium conditions in the following also hold for mixed strategies, even
if we do not repeat their formal definition here; we will only make use of the fact that mixed
strategies imply certain conditional investment probabilities at any stopping time.4
4See Riedel and Steg (2014) for the formal definition of mixed strategies. They specify for any subgame a
distribution function over the remaining time (Gϑi (t)), taking into account the dynamic information about the
state of the world, and some extensions (αϑi (t)) to model preemption in continuous time.
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3.1 Sufficient equilibrium conditions
In order to construct subgame-perfect equilibria with preemption, we first establish two classes
of equilibria for certain subgames where some immediate investment occurs.
3.1.1 Simultaneous investment
The followers’ reaction times τ iF (·) are central for any equilibrium analysis, as they enter also
the leader payoff. As a first observation, the assumption piB2· − piF2· ≤ piB1· − piF1· implies the
reverse order for the reaction times and allows to identify simultaneous investment equilibria.
Lemma 3.1. τ1F (ϑ) ≤ τ2F (ϑ) and F 1ϑ −M1ϑ ≤ F 2ϑ −M2ϑ a.s. for any ϑ ∈ T .
Proof. The follower problem (2.1) (with ϑ replacing t) is equivalent to minimizing the oppor-
tunity cost of waiting E
[∫ τ
ϑ (pi
Bi
s − piFis ) ds
∣∣Fϑ], τ ≥ ϑ. By optimality of τ iF (ϑ), it holds that
E
[∫ τ iF (ϑ)
τ (pi
Bi
s −piFis ) ds
∣∣Fτ ] ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ [ϑ, τ iF (ϑ)] and E[∫ ττ iF (ϑ)(piBis −piFis ) ds ∣∣Fτ iF (ϑ)] ≥ 0
for all τ ≥ τ iF (ϑ), strictly on {τ > τ iF (ϑ)}, since τ iF (ϑ) is the latest time attaining (2.1).
Thus, with ϑ′ = min{τ1F (ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)} and piB2· − piF2· ≤ piB1· − piF1· we have
0 ≤ E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ)
ϑ
′ (pi
B2
s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′] ≤ E[∫ τ
1
F (ϑ)
ϑ
′ (pi
B1
s − piF1s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′] ≤ 0.
The first inequality is strict on {τ2F (ϑ) < τ1F (ϑ)}, so τ1F (ϑ) ≤ τ2F (ϑ) a.s.
Finally, F iϑ−M iϑ = ess supτ≥ϑE[
∫ τ
ϑ (pi
Fi
s −piBis ) ds |Fϑ] is less for firm 1 than for firm 2.
Lemma 3.1 shows that where τ = ϑ attains F 2ϑ , it also attains F 1ϑ , such that F iϑ = M iϑ
for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Then it is an equilibrium that both firms invest immediately. Indeed,
given that the opponent plans to invest immediately, each firm i can either invest by choosing
τ iϑ = ϑ, or become follower from any strategy τ iϑ > ϑ of investing later if no one invests before,
which implies the same expected payoff, but with actual investment at τ iF (ϑ). If firm i chose
τ iϑ > ϑ, however, the other firm would obtain more options and might not want to invest
immediately anymore, so proactive investment by both firms is important for the equilibrium.
This principle also applies at ϑ′ = τ2F (ϑ), which satisfies ϑ′ = τ2F (ϑ′) due to τ iF (τ iF (ϑ)) =
τ iF (ϑ) by definition. Then Lemma 3.1 implies that it would be mandatory to follow immedi-
ately for firm 1, too, ϑ′ = τ1F (ϑ′) = τ2F (ϑ′), and thus Liϑ′ = F
i
ϑ
′ = M i
ϑ
′ for both i ∈ {1, 2}. In
this case any unilateral deviation still implies immediate investment, but as a reaction to the
opponent’s investment. Even if all strategies of firm i now lead to the same physical outcome
given the strategy of its opponent, it is important to distinguish strategies to actually support
the equilibrium.
3.1.2 Preemption
Preemption is to be expected where both firms have a strict first-mover advantage Liϑ > F iϑ
(which requires ϑ < τ1F (ϑ)), such that both firms may try to invest although they want to
avoid simultaneous investment.
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Given the assumption piL1· − piF1· ≥ piL2· − piF2· , also firm 1’s first-mover advantage is not
less than that of firm 2.
Lemma 3.2. L1ϑ − F 1ϑ ≥ L2ϑ − F 2ϑ a.s. for any ϑ ∈ T .
Proof. We have
L2ϑ − F 2ϑ = E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ)
ϑ
(piL2s − piF2s ) ds+
∫ τ2F (ϑ)
τ
1
F (ϑ)
(piB2s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] (3.1)
and
L1ϑ − F 1ϑ = E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ)
ϑ
(piL1s − piF1s ) ds+
∫ τ2F (ϑ)
τ
1
F (ϑ)
(piL1s − piB1s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ],
where τ1F (ϑ) ≤ τ2F (ϑ) by Lemma 3.1. By the optimality of τ2F (ϑ) for stopping the stream
(piB2· −piF2· ), the second integral on the RHS of (3.1) has non-positive conditional expectation,
cf. the proof of Lemma 3.1. The claim now follows from the assumptions piL1· −piF1· ≥ piL2· −piF2·
and piL1· ≥ piB1· .
By Lemma 3.2, the preemption region – where both firms have a strict first-mover advan-
tage – is P := {L2 > F 2}.
Let τP(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |L2t > F 2t } ∈ T denote the first hitting time of the preemption
region from ϑ ∈ T . At ϑ′ = τP(ϑ) there exists a preemption equilibrium given by Proposition
3.1 of Riedel and Steg (2014), in which both firms plan to invest immediately. Some strategy
extensions allow the firms to coordinate endogenously to a certain degree about the roles of
leader and follower. In that equilibrium, any player can realize a strict first-mover advantage
iff the opponent is indifferent between roles. By Lemma 3.2, here only firm 1’s preemption
equilibrium payoff can be L1τP (ϑ) > F
1
τP (ϑ) where L
2
τP (ϑ) = F
2
τP (ϑ); otherwise it is only F
1
τP (ϑ).
Firm 2’s preemption payoff is always F 2τP (ϑ).
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The location of the preemption region P will be characterized in Section 3.1.5. By (3.1) one
can already see that P = ∅ if, e.g., even piB1· −piF1· ≥ piL2· −piF2· , because E
[∫ τ iF (ϑ)
ϑ (pi
Bi
s −piFi· ) ds
∣∣
Fϑ
] ≤ 0 by the optimality of τ iF (ϑ), i = 1, 2.
3.1.3 Subgame-perfect equilibrium with preemption
The subsequent equilibrium construction is facilitated by the fact that independently of what
happens in the preemption region, no firm ever wants to invest with a current second-mover
advantage under the present assumptions.
Lemma 3.3. Investment is never optimal for any firm i ∈ {1, 2} where F i· > Li· . Further,
waiting until min
{
τP(ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)
}
does not restrict firm 2’s payoff in the subgame at ϑ ∈ T for
any (mixed) strategy of firm 1.
5These payoffs can of course also simply be assumed if both firms invest at τP(ϑ).
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Proof: See Appendix A.2.
It is crucial for Lemma 3.3 that (F it ) here is a submartingale while it strictly exceeds (Lit);
the fact F i· > Li· alone does not suffice to delay investment – in contrast to the customary
suggestion throughout the literature (like the examples in the Introduction).
By Lemma 3.3 we may assume that firm 2 is inactive from any ϑ until min
{
τP(ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)
}
,
where preemption or simultaneous investment is an equilibrium. Assuming that firm 2 invests
by the corresponding strategy at that point, it remains to determine an optimal time for firm
1 to invest up to min
{
τP(ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)
}
, which, unlike firm 2, may have a strict first-mover
advantage before τP(ϑ) and be willing to exploit it.
If firm 1 waits until min
{
τP(ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)
}
, its local equilibrium payoff from preemption or
simultaneous investment derived before is L1· ≥ F 1· where τ2F (ϑ) < τP(ϑ) or where L2· = F 2·
(in particular where τP(ϑ) = τ2F (ϑ)); it is F 1· < L1· where L2· > F 2· at τP(ϑ) < τ2F (ϑ).
Thus the “equilibrium stopping problem” for firm 1 at any ϑ ∈ T is
ess sup
ϑ≤τ≤τP (ϑ)∧τ2F (ϑ)
E
[
L1τ1{τ<τP (ϑ)}∪{L2τ=F 2τ } + F
1
τ 1{τ=τP (ϑ)}∩{L2τ>F 2τ }
∣∣∣Fϑ]
= ess sup
ϑ≤τ≤τP (ϑ)∧τ2F (ϑ)
E
[
L1τ1{L2τ≤F 2τ } + F
1
τ 1{L2τ>F 2τ }
∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.2)
Note that firm 1 realizes L1τ on {τ < τP(ϑ)} ∪ {L2τ = F 2τ } = {L2τ ≤ F 2τ }. If it has a solution
τ1∗ (ϑ), the value of problem (3.2) is firm 1’s equilibrium payoff at ϑ, and that of firm 2 is
E
[
F 2
τ
1
∗ (ϑ)
∣∣Fϑ], getting the local equilibrium payoff F 2· also where τ1∗ (ϑ) = min{τP(ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)}.
We can summarize as follows.
Theorem 3.4. If there is a family of solutions
{
τ1∗ (ϑ)
∣∣ϑ ∈ T } to (3.2) satisfying the time-
consistency condition τ1∗ (ϑ) = τ1∗ (ϑ′) a.s. on the event {ϑ′ ≤ τ1∗ (ϑ)} for any two ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T ,
then there is the following subgame-perfect equilibrium. In the subgame beginning at ϑ ∈ T ,
firm 1’s strategy is to invest at τ1∗ (ϑ) and firm 2’s to invest at τ2∗ (ϑ) = min
{
τP(ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)
}
,
with the mixed strategy extensions from Proposition 3.1 of Riedel and Steg (2014) governing
preemption at τP(ϑ).
Time consistency can easily be ensured whenever there exist optimal stopping times τ1∗ (ϑ),
ϑ ∈ T , by choosing always the respective first or last ones.6 It holds automatically if the
τ1∗ (ϑ) are of threshold-type in a state-space model.
Existence of a solution τ1∗ (ϑ) to (3.2) is generally not clear, however, because of a possible
discontinuity of the payoff process at τP(ϑ) where ϑ < τP(ϑ) < τ2F (ϑ) and L2τP (ϑ) > F
2
τP (ϑ),
which then implies also L1τP (ϑ) > F
1
τP (ϑ).
A sufficient condition for existence of a solution τ1∗ (ϑ) is that the process
(
L2t − F 2t
)
is
6The families
{
τP(ϑ)
∣∣ϑ ∈ T } and {τ2F (ϑ) ∣∣ϑ ∈ T } satisfy the time-consistency condition by construction
and thus also
{
τ
2
∗ (ϑ)
∣∣ ϑ ∈ T }. As the latter are the constraints in (3.2), any family of earliest or latest
solutions
{
τ
1
∗ (ϑ)
∣∣ϑ ∈ T } will then be time consistent, respectively. The strategy extensions for preemption
from Proposition 3.1 of Riedel and Steg (2014) are time consistent by construction.
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lower semi-continuous, since then L2τP (ϑ) = F
2
τP (ϑ) on {ϑ < τP(ϑ)}, where (3.2) reduces to
ess sup
ϑ≤τ≤τP (ϑ)∧τ2F (ϑ)
E
[
L1τ
∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.3)
Proposition 3.5. Assume that L2t − F 2t is lower semi-continuous from the left. Then there
exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium as described in Theorem 3.4, with each τ1∗ (ϑ) the respective
latest solution of
ess sup
ϑ≤τ≤τP (ϑ)∧τ2F (ϑ)
E
[∫ τ
0
pi01s ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piL1s ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.4)
That the solutions of problem (3.3) are the (existing) solutions of the conceptually much
simpler constrained permanent monopoly problem (3.4) follows from the fact that the follower
reaction time τ2F (τ) in L1τ remains constant for τ ∈ [ϑ, τ2F (ϑ)], cf. Lemma 3.10 below. One can
even ignore the constraint τ ≤ τ2F (ϑ) in (3.4) if piL1· − pi01· ≥ piB1· − piF1· (as in market entry
with pi0i· ≡ piFi· ), because then the solution is to stop no later that at τ1F (ϑ) ≤ τ2F (ϑ), see the
discussion after Lemma 3.10. Of course it is optimal to stop in (3.4) when it is so for i = 1 in
the completely unconstrained monopoly problem
ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[∫ τ
0
pi0is ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piLis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.5)
Without (lower semi-)continuity of L2t − F 2t , the simpler problem (3.4) still provides a
sufficient condition for stopping in (3.2), because the continuation value in (3.2) is at most
that in (3.3). Indeed, firm 1 receives a local payoff F 1· in (3.2) only at the terminal date and
where it has a first-mover advantage (at τP(ϑ), precisely if L1· − F 1· ≥ L2· − F 2· > 0). That
means, if the local payoff L1· is optimal in (3.3), it is so in (3.2), or, using (3.4), whenever it is
optimal to switch from the stream pi01s to piL1s immediately (with or without constraint), one
also has τ1∗ (ϑ) = ϑ.
3.1.4 Equilibria without preemption
There can be other equilibria without preemption, even if the preemption region is non-
empty. For instance, joint investment at a future stopping time τJ can be an equilibrium in
the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T if no firm wants to deviate and become leader before. The
firms can also plan to invest sequentially if one accepts to become follower when the other
invests. Such equilibria depend on the relative magnitudes of the revenue processes, however,
so existence cannot be ensured by simple regularity properties like continuity sufficing for the
equilibria of Theorem 3.4. On the contrary, if piFi· ≡ pi0i· and Liϑ > F iϑ, then firm i prefers
investing immediately over waiting until firm j invests at some τ j∗ > ϑ, because waiting would
yield at most E
[
F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ] and (F it ) is a supermartingale now.
If piFi· < pi0i· occurs (e.g., due to the first investment stealing business), then the following
proposition helps to reduce the search for times at which firm i may still want to preempt
firm j and thus to verify a best reply τ i∗ ≥ τ j∗ . It avoids to maximize the leader payoff directly,
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which is a complex problem due to the follower reaction. Applied to state-space models, it
may suffice to consider deviations at a single threshold, like in the examples in Section 4.
Proposition 3.6. Consider any given ϑ ∈ T and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. If firm j plans to invest
at the stopping time τ j∗ ≥ ϑ, then τ i∗ ≥ τ j∗ is a best reply for firm i if F iτ j∗ = M
i
τ
j
∗
on {τ i∗ = τ j∗}
and
(i) E
[
F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ] ≥ ess supτ∈[ϑ,τ j∗ ]E[M iτ ∣∣Fϑ] and
(ii) for each stopping time ϑ′ ≥ ϑ, on {ϑ′ < τ j∗} one of the solutions τ iD(ϑ′) ∈ T of the
problem
ess sup
τ∈[ϑ′,τ j∗∨ϑ′]
E
[∫ τ
0
pi0is ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piLis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′] (3.6)
satisfies either τ iD(ϑ′) ≥ τ jF (ϑ′) or Liτ iD(ϑ′) ≤ E
[
F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣F
τ
i
D(ϑ
′)
]
.
Where ϑ′ attains (3.6), it holds that Li
ϑ
′−E[F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ′] ≥ E[Liτ −F iτ j∗ ∣∣Fϑ′] for all stopping
times τ ∈ [ϑ′, τ jF (ϑ′)].
Further, if piL1· − pi01· ≥ piL2· − pi02· , piB1· − pi01· ≥ piB2· − pi02· , F 2τ2∗ = M
2
τ
2
∗
and (i), (ii) hold
for i = 1, then τ1∗ = τ2∗ are mutual best replies.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Condition (i) is obviously also necessary, since the terminal payoff is at most F i
τ
j
∗
(without
preemption modeled as in Section 3.1.2) and Li· ≥ M i· . Condition (ii) says that it suffices to
check for deviations by firm i at solutions τ i(ϑ′) < τ jF (ϑ
′) of (3.6), so there is nothing to check
where ϑ′ = τ jF (ϑ
′). Note that the joint investment problem in condition (i) and the constrained
monopoly problem (3.6) involve no follower reactions τ jF (τ) and are thus conceptually simpler
than determining an optimal deviation time to become leader. In threshold-type models, it
is typically enough to consider ϑ′ = τ iD(ϑ): if firm i does not want to become leader there,
it does not at any value that the state process will attain before crossing firm j’s follower
threshold that determines τ jF (ϑ). For states above that threshold, no deviations need to be
considered.
Proposition 3.6 immediately allows to identify equilibria of joint investment at some time
τJ = τ1∗ = τ2∗ ≥ ϑ. Therefore on the one hand F 2τJ = M2τJ is necessary, which automatically
implies F 1τJ = M
1
τJ
by Lemma 3.1. On the other hand, (i) is then the clearly necessary condi-
tion that τJ must be an (at least constrained) optimal time for maximizing the expected joint
investment payoff E
[
M iτJ
∣∣Fϑ]. Given such τJ , an equilibrium can be verified by condition
(ii), where it suffices to consider firm 1 if the additional revenue order holds. The problem of
maximizing E
[
M iτJ
∣∣Fϑ] is considered in Lemma 3.11 below.
If delayed joint investment is not feasible because firm 1, say, would want to become leader
before, then preemption may still be avoidable in an equilibrium with sequential investment.
In the equilibria of Theorem 3.4 for an empty preemption region, firm 1 becomes leader
at an optimal time before simultaneous investment would happen at τ2F (ϑ). Simply ignoring
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preemption in a non-empty preemption region, but keeping simultaneous investment at τ2F (ϑ),
firm 1’s problem becomes
ess sup
τ∈[ϑ,τ2F (ϑ)]
E
[
L1τ
∣∣∣Fϑ], (3.7)
since F 1· = M1· = L1· at τ2F (ϑ). Problem (3.7) is again equivalent to a constrained monopoly
problem by Lemma 3.10 below and has a solution τS ∈ T . Any such solution is a best reply
for firm 1 against firm 2’s strategy τ2∗ = τ2F (ϑ). Optimality of the latter for firm 2 against
τ1∗ = τS ≤ τ2F (ϑ) can be verified by Proposition 3.6, which now simplifies as follows.
Corollary 3.7. Consider any ϑ ∈ T and let τS ∈ T solve (3.7). It is an equilibrium in the
subgame beginning at ϑ that firm 1 plans to invest at τ1∗ = τS and firm 2 at τ2∗ = τ2F (ϑ) if
condition (ii) of Proposition 3.6 is satisfied for firm i = 2.
Further, if piL1· − pi01· ≥ piL2· − pi02· , then τ2D(ϑ′) = τS attains (3.6) where ϑ′ ≤ τ1∗ = τS.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
In the setting of Corollary 3.7, condition (ii) of Proposition 3.6 holds if firm 2 will not have a
local first-mover advantage where τ2D(ϑ′) < τ1F (ϑ′) attains (3.6), since (F 2t ) is a submartingale
on [ϑ′, τ2F (ϑ′)]. Under the additional revenue order in the corollary, this simply amounts to
τS not being in the preemption region P.
3.1.5 Preemption region
Concerning the location of the preemption region P, we can say the following, which will be
particularly helpful in state-space models, in which the unilateral stopping problems (like the
follower reaction problem) have threshold-type solutions, like in the examples in Section 4.
First, we already noted that we are never inside the preemption region when firm 1 would
follow immediately: ϑ = τ1F (ϑ) ⇒ L2ϑ = M2ϑ ≤ F 2ϑ . Indeed, we are not even on the boundary
of the preemption region where ϑ = τ1F (ϑ) and where it would not be optimal for firm 2 to
follow immediately, since then L2ϑ = M2ϑ < F 2ϑ and hence ϑ < τP(ϑ) by right-continuity of the
processes.
Second, to see if the preemption region is empty, it suffices to consider certain simple
optimal stopping times, which are the solutions of firm i’s permanent monopoly problem
(3.5) if pi0i· ≡ piFi· (like in a market entry model).
Lemma 3.8. For any ϑ ∈ T , L2ϑ > F 2ϑ only if E
[
L2τ − F 2τ
∣∣Fϑ] > 0 for all times τ i∆ ∈ T
attaining
ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[∫ τ
0
piFis ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piLis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] (3.8)
for some firm i ∈ {1, 2}. Where τ2∆ = ϑ attains (3.8) for i = 2, it holds that L2ϑ − F 2ϑ ≥
E
[
L2τ − F 2τ
∣∣Fϑ] for all τ ∈ [ϑ, τ1F (ϑ)].
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
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The implications of L2· ≤ F 2· at any τ iF (ϑ) as observed before and Lemma 3.8 for state-
space models like in Section 4 are the following. First, a follower threshold for either firm i,
say xiF ∈ R, is never contained in the preemption region7, not even in its closure if investment
at x1F is not optimal for firm 2. As L2· ≤ F 2· for all states above such xiF , the latter must
lie above any non-empty preemption region. Second, any non-empty preemption region must
intersect the stopping regions from (3.8) for both i = 1, 2; a threshold solving that problem,
say xi∆ ∈ R, cannot lie above the preemption region. In particular, if x2∆ ≥ x1F , the preemption
region must be empty. Third, if firm 2 has no first-mover advantage at x2∆, then it has none
at any value that the state will attain before crossing x1F . Thus, if the state, starting from
some x2∆ < x1F , will attain any intermediate value before reaching x1F , then it is sufficient to
check whether there is a first-mover advantage for firm 2 at x2∆; otherwise the preemption
region is empty, because x2∆ cannot lie above it.
3.2 Necessary equilibrium conditions
Lemma 3.3 has established that investment is never optimal with a current strict second-mover
advantage F iϑ > Liϑ, given the standing assumptions piLi· ≥ piBi· and pi0i· ≥ piFi· . This section
presents some counterparts: conditions when investment is unavoidable in equilibrium.
3.2.1 The leader stopping problem
Already from (2.4) it has been evident that equilibria are related to optimally stopping the
leader payoff process, subject to certain constraints. Now we consider the unconstrained
problem of when to become leader, to obtain a necessary condition for any equilibrium: the
assumptions piLi· ≥ piBi· and pi0i· ≥ piFi· imply the following “terminal” points of the game,
where some investment must occur at the latest.
Lemma 3.9. In any equilibrium for the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T , the game cannot continue
past any last optimal time for any firm i = 1, 2 to become leader, i.e., past any maximal τ il ∈ T
attaining
ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ
∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.9)
At any τ il ∈ T that attains (3.9), it is also optimal for a permanent monopolist to invest
immediately, i.e., τ il also attains
ess sup
τ≥τ il
E
[∫ τ
0
pi0is ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piLis ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ il
]
.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3.9 rests on the observation that if it is optimal to become leader immediately in
(3.9), then there is no superior future follower payoff, either: if firm i had the choice when to
7Here “the preemption region” refers to an area in the same state space in which the thresholds are defined,
which is of course an abuse of terminology regarding the previous definition of P.
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become follower, it would generally prefer times τ iF (·) to avoid the low revenue piFi· . At any
τ iF (·), however, becoming follower is not better than becoming leader by piLi· ≥ piBi· .
The stopping problem (3.9) of when to become optimally the leader implicitly assumes
that the respective opponent only ever invests by reacting optimally after firm i’s investment,
whereas the permanent monopoly problem assumes that the opponent never invests at all.
When looking for solutions of the former (in particular latest ones), it suffices to consider
solutions of the latter. The reverse is not true, however, due to the dependence of Li· on the
follower’s reaction. When a permanent monopolist finds it optimal to invest, it may be that
the opponent would follow immediately in the leader problem; but when only piBi· can be
realized, it may be better to wait for a time when the follower will react with a lag.8
Therefore (3.9) is a difficult problem in general. It becomes much easier with a state-
space structure, like in the applications in Section 4, or by considering certain “continuation”
equilibria, like simultaneous investment at τ2F (ϑ). Then any earlier investment by firm 1 does
not affect the follower investment timing by firm 2.
Lemma 3.10. Suppose that firm 2’s strategy in the subgame at ϑ ∈ T is such that the game
ends no later than at τ2F (ϑ). Then it is uniquely optimal for firm 1 to invest immediately
where ϑ uniquely solves
ess sup
τ∈[ϑ,τ2F (ϑ)]
E
[
L1τ
∣∣∣Fϑ],
which has the same solutions as
ess sup
τ∈[ϑ,τ2F (ϑ)]
E
[∫ τ
0
pi01s ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piL1s ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.10)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The observation behind Lemma 3.10 is that if firm 2 will invest (no later than) when
τ2F (ϑ) is reached, then earlier investment by 1 does not “trigger” a response at τ2F (ϑ) that
might otherwise have come later, i.e., it does not cannibalize any monopoly revenue piL1· after
τ2F (ϑ). Then only the constrained problem of becoming leader up to τ2F (ϑ) is relevant for the
reasoning of Lemma 3.9, which indeed has the same solutions as (3.10). It is important that
firm 1 will not regret to receive piB1· from τ2F (ϑ) on by having invested before.9
In particular, if a monopolist’s investment gain piL1· − pi01· is not less than a follower’s,
piB1· − piF1· (as in typical market entry with pi0i· ≡ piFi· ), then the latest solution of (3.10) does
not exceed τ1F (ϑ), where any delay only means foregone revenue for a follower in (2.1), and
firm 1 would now lose at least as much as prospective leader. Then immediate investment
is dominant at τ1F (ϑ), irrespective of when exactly firm 2 plans to invest on [τ1F (ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)].
In this case the constraint τ ≤ τ2F (ϑ) becomes irrelevant in (3.10), which reduces to the
unconstrained problem (3.5).
8See Remark A.3 in Appendix A.1 on the relation between the monopolist and leader problems for standard
diffusion models.
9Firm 2, on the contrary, might forego some revenue piL2· on [τ1F (ϑ), τ2F (ϑ)] by investing before τ1F (ϑ), or, if
it can only become leader up to τ1F (ϑ), it may prefer to become follower there and effectively invest later.
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Another “continuation” equilibrium that potentially induces earlier investment is preemp-
tion at τP(ϑ) as in Section 3.1.2. Given preemption in P (or an empty preemption region),
firm 2 can never realize local payoffs exceeding F 2· , whence the game has to end immediately
at all latest optimal times to stop the process (F 2t ). Such times have to satisfy τ = τ2F (τ)
(since F 2τ ≤ E
[
F 2
τ
2
F (τ)
∣∣Fτ ] by pi02· ≥ piF2· ), where simultaneous investment is an equilibrium
with payoffs Liτ = F iτ = M iτ , i = 1, 2, as observed before, so firm 2 can also enforce these
payoffs by investing.
However, given the assumption pi02· ≥ piF2· , a stopping time satisfying τ = τ2F (τ) only
maximizes firm 2’s follower payoff if it is also optimal to switch to piB2· directly from pi02· ,
which is what happens under simultaneous investment.
Lemma 3.11. Every stopping time τ iM ≥ ϑ that attains
ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
M iτ
∣∣∣Fϑ] = ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[∫ τ
0
pi0is ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] (3.11)
for some given ϑ ∈ T and i ∈ {1, 2} also attains
ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
F iτ
∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.12)
If τ iM ≥ ϑ attains (3.12), then τ iF (τ iM ) also attains (3.11). In particular, the latest solution of
(3.11) is the latest solution of (3.12).
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
If pi0i· ≡ piFi· , as in typical market entry models, then (3.11) equals F iϑ and (F it ) is a
supermartingale and indeed τ iF (ϑ) the latest time attaining (3.12). In particular, any delay
at τ2F (ϑ) then means foregone revenue for firm i = 2 and immediate investment must occur
(conditional on preemption if P was reached). Firm 1 may then want to invest even earlier
in response by Lemma 3.10.
In general, however, it need not be optimal for firm 2 to secure the follower payoff at τ2F (ϑ)
by proactive investment. It may be better to become follower later if possible, to benefit from
a high pre-investment revenue: where ϑ = τ2F (ϑ) ≤ τ , E
[
F 2τ
∣∣Fϑ]−F 2ϑ ≥ E[M2τ ∣∣Fϑ]−M2ϑ =
E
[∫ τ
ϑ (pi
02
s −piB2s ) ds
∣∣Fϑ], which may be positive if pi02· > piF2· ; but here it depends on firm 1’s
strategy, of course, whether F 2τ can be realized (e.g., by delayed joint investment).
4 Applications
As an illustration, the previous general results will now be applied to two typical models from
the strategic real options literature, in order to provide complete proofs for basic equilibrium
outcomes that are discussed extensively in the literature, to develop additional equilibria that
may constitute Pareto improvements, and to point out that some equilibria analyzed in the
literature only exist under additional restrictions, if at all. The model of Pawlina and Kort
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(2006) first serves as the main vehicle; then the results of Grenadier (1996) will be put into
perspective by the same arguments, although that model is quite different.
4.1 Irreversible investment with asymmetric costs
The model of Pawlina and Kort (2006) is quite prototypic for the real options literature.
However, the preemption equilibrium outcome proposed in that paper is not supported by
the strategies described therein.10 Theorem 3.4 yields even subgame-perfect equilibria, which
we will analyze in more detail, including some behavior not treated by Pawlina and Kort
(2006). Their revenue streams for firm i ∈ {1, 2} are
pi0it = e−rtxtD00, piLit = e−rt(xtD10 − rIi),
piFit = e−rtxtD01, piBit = e−rt(xtD11 − rIi),
 (4.1)
with discount factor r > 0 and demand uncertainty reflected by a geometric Brownian motion
(xt)t≥0 satisfying
dxt = µxt dt+ σxt dBt, (4.2)
where (Bt)t≥0 is Brownian noise, µ < r the expected growth rate and σ > 0 the volatility.
The constants D10 ≥ D11 and D00 ≥ D01 capture a negative impact of investment on the
opponent’s revenue, and I2 ≥ I1 > 0 are the constant investment costs, here capitalized.
The leader and follower processes are then continuous (as functions of the state xt), and the
present instances of the follower problems (2.1) and the monopoly problems (3.5) are solved
by stopping when xt exceeds some thresholds xiF and xiL, respectively.11 Thus, simultaneous
investment is an equilibrium for all states xϑ ≥ x2F .
If the preemption region in this model is non-empty, it is characterized by an open interval
(
¯
x, x¯) of the state space R+ with x¯ ≤ x1F ≤ x2F (where both inequalities are strict if I2 > I1
and D10 > D11 > D01), such that one can simply call (¯
x, x¯) preemption region. The proof of
the following proposition generalizes to other models driven by a continuous Markov process
that affects revenues monotonically.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the specification (4.1). There are two numbers
¯
x ≤ x¯ ∈ (0, x1F ]
such that L2t > F 2t ⇔ xt ∈ (¯x, x¯) for all t ∈ R+.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
By Lemma 3.8 and the discussion thereafter it is enough to check if L20 − F 20 > 0 for
x0 = x2∆, the threshold solving (3.8), which is the case iff the cost-disadvantage I2/I1 is not
10Pawlina and Kort (2006) do not model preemption and just state that the high cost firm 2 invests at its
follower threshold x2F . Knowing that, firm 1 could decide when to become optimally the leader up to that
point and would not be willing to invest already at the preemption point. Even taking preemption as given,
it is not verified that both firms are willing to wait until the preemption point; the argument that there is a
second-mover advantage is not sufficient.
11If D11 > D01, then xiF =
β1
β1−1 ·
I
i(r−µ)
D11−D01 , where β1 > 1 is the positive root of
1
2σ
2
β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0.
If D11 ≤ D01, then xiF =∞. Analogously, xiL = β1β1−1 ·
I
i(r−µ)
(D10−D00)+ .
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too large; otherwise firm 2 prefers to invest much later than firm 1 and the preemption region
is empty (in particular if x2∆ ≥ x1F , where firm 1 would follow immediately).12
We can now characterize the equilibria of Theorem 3.4 for this model, which also have
outcomes not captured in Pawlina and Kort (2006). Continuity ensures existence and it
suffices to solve the simpler constrained monopoly problems (3.4) from Proposition 3.5. By
the strong Markov property, this amounts to finding the region in the state space R+ where
immediate stopping is optimal for the problem at t = 0,
sup
τ≤τP (0)∧τ2F (0)
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rs(xs(D10 −D00)− rI1) ds
]
. (4.3)
The constraint here takes the form min{τP(0), τ2F (0)} = inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ∈ (¯x, x¯) ∪ [x
2
F ,∞)} =
inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ∈ [¯x, x¯] ∪ [x
2
F ,∞)} a.s. Problem (3.4) is then solved by stopping once the state
xt hits the stopping region {x ∈ R+ | τ = 0 attains (4.3) for x0 = x} from time ϑ.
First consider a non-empty preemption region (
¯
x, x¯) that is connected to the unconstrained
monopoly stopping set [x1L,∞), which is the case, e.g., for the market entry variant of the
model with D01 = D00, see Lemma 3.8. Then immediate stopping is optimal in (4.3) for any
state x0 ≥ x¯ ≥ x1L, as it is in the unconstrained problem. Since the preemption constraint in
(4.3) is a constant upper threshold for states x0 < ¯
x, it is optimal to wait there until xt exceeds
either the constraint
¯
x or the unconstrained threshold x1L, see Lemma A.4 in Appendix A.1.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium is complete in this case: no investment for states strictly
below min{
¯
x, x1L}, preemptive investment in [¯x, x¯] as described in Section 3.1.2, firm 1 invest-ing as the leader in [x1L, x2F ) \ [¯x, x¯], and simultaneous investment for all states in [x
2
F ,∞).
If D00 = D01, we can also conclude that preemption cannot be avoided and consequently
neither simultaneous investment in [x2F ,∞) by Lemma 3.11, such that the equilibrium is
unique: If the preemption region is non-empty, it certainly contains the optimal stopping
region for the continuous process L2t − F 2t , which takes positive values only there. Then one
also has to stop L2t in that stopping region, the problem considered in Lemma 3.9, because
L2t = (L2t − F 2t ) + F 2t and F 2t is a supermartingale now.
Next, if the preemption region is empty, then firm 2 simply plans to invest as soon as the
state hits [x2F ,∞), such that for states below it, firm 1 only faces the upper constraint x2F in
(4.3). Again by Lemma A.4, it is then optimal for firm 1 to invest as soon as xt exceeds either
the constraint x2F or the unconstrained monopoly threshold x1L. Note that in the market entry
variant with D00 = D01 < D11, x1L ≤ x1F < x2F <∞.
However, even if firm 1 uses the unconstrained monopoly threshold in this case, and thus
acts as if it ignored firm 2 completely, this does not mean that firm 1 is able to maximize
12The precise condition (I2/I1)β1−1 < ((1 + c)β1 − 1)/(β1c) if c := (D10 − D11)/(D11 − D01) ∈ (0,∞) is
obtained by plugging x2∆ =
β1
β1−1 ·
I
2(r−µ)
(D10−D01)+ (cf. fn. 11) into the explicit functional expressions for the leader
and follower values (8) and (9) in Pawlina and Kort (2006), who identify the same condition by a graphical
argument. This condition indeed implies the weaker x2∆ < x1F . The constraint on the cost ratio strictly exceeds
1 and is strictly increasing in c to ∞, since β1 > 1. If D10 > D01 ≥ D11, then x1F = ∞ and the preemption
region is non-empty for all I2 ≥ I1. Finally, if D10 ≤ max{D11, D01}, then x2∆ ≥ x1F and the preemption
region is empty.
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the unconstrained leader payoff, as it could if it had the exclusive right to invest first (like a
Stackelberg leader). Firm 1 only maximizes the leader payoff subject to firm 2 investing also
proactively in [x2F ,∞). The latter is unavoidable in the market entry variant with an empty
preemption region, since the threshold x2F then uniquely solves problem (3.11) for firm 2.
4.1.1 Preemption when demand falls
So far, if x1L ≤ x¯ or P = ∅, there has been immediate investment by some firm in any state
above min{
¯
x, x1L} and no investment below it (also in case P = ∅, then setting ¯x = x¯ = x
2
F ).
To complete the explicit description of the equilibria from Theorem 3.4, it remains to consider
a monopoly threshold lying above a non-empty preemption region, x1L > x¯ > ¯
x, which requires
a sufficiently high pre-investment revenue level D00 > D01. Firm 1 may then remain inactive
even where it would invest immediately as follower (in states above x1F ), because it has higher
opportunity costs as prospective leader. This case is not addressed by Pawlina and Kort
(2006), who only consider states below
¯
x, where the same observation as before applies:
firm 1 waits until xt hits the constraint ¯
x < x1L. Problem (4.3) becomes more complicated
for x0 ∈ (x¯, x2F ), where both constraints may become binding if that interval intersects the
continuation region [0, x1L) of the unconstrained problem.
A lower constraint like the present x¯ has a much stronger effect than any upper constraint
considered before. Two cases can be distinguished for the problem of delaying the revenue
change piL1t −pi01t = e−rt(xt(D10−D00)−rI1) in [x¯, x2F ]. The easier one is that x(D10−D00) >
rI1 on all of (x¯, x2F ). Then it is optimal to stop immediately everywhere, since any delay is
a loss of revenue. The more difficult case is that x(D10 − D00) < rI1 near the preemption
region. Firm 1 must wait where this inequality holds, in order not to start with running losses,
so one has to determine the stopping region towards the upper constraint x2F .
Proposition 4.2. Consider the specification (4.1) and suppose the corresponding preemption
region (
¯
x, x¯) ⊂ (0, x1F ] from Proposition 4.1 is non-empty. If x¯(D10 − D00) ≥ rI1, then
the solution of problem (4.3) for all states x0 in (x¯, x2F ) is to stop immediately, while if
D10 −D00 ≤ 0, the solution is to wait until the state exits (x¯, x2F ).
If 0 < x¯(D10 − D00) < rI1, then there is a unique threshold xˆ ∈ [rI1/(D10 − D00), x1L)
solving
(β1 − 1)A(x)xβ1 + (β2 − 1)B(x)xβ2 = I1 (4.4)
with (
A(x)
B(x)
)
=
[
x¯β1xβ2 − xβ1 x¯β2
]−1( xβ2 −x¯β2
−xβ1 x¯β1
)(
x¯D10−D00r−µ − I1
xD10−D00r−µ − I1
)
(4.5)
and β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 the roots of 12σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0, and the solution of problem
(4.3) for all states x0 in (x¯, x2F ) is to stop when (xt) exits (x¯, xˆ ∧ x2F ).
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
In particular, if x2F (D10 −D00) ≤ rI1, then xˆ ≥ x2F and the solution is to wait until the
state exits (x¯, x2F ). It is easy to calculate the solutions xˆ of (4.4), which are typically much
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lower than the upper constraint x2F or the unconstrained solution x1L. Thus, the risk of getting
trapped at x¯ by preemption implies very early stopping, as illustrated in Section 4.1.4 below.
4.1.2 Joint investment equilibria
If D00 > D01, then there are potentially many more equilibria than those from Theorem 3.4,
since one can now drop the premise that preemption occurs in the preemption region, and/or
that simultaneous investment occurs everywhere above x2F .
We will first apply Proposition 3.6 to joint investment at some threshold, which cannot
be below x2F for simultaneous investment to be an equilibrium. The highest expected value
of joint investment can be achieved by solving (3.11), which yields a maximal threshold, say
x1M for firm 1. But we can also consider constrained versions of that problem, with some
investment threshold xJ ∈ [x2F , x1M ]. Joint investment when xt ≥ xJ now is an equilibrium if
firm 1 does not want to become leader at the threshold solving (3.6), which is min{xJ , x1L}
again by Lemma A.4. Specifically, the cost difference cannot be too large, such that firm 1
cannot enjoy a leader’s monopoly revenue for very long, which bounds L1· .
Proposition 4.3. Consider the specification (4.1) and let x1M ≥ x1L ∈ [0,∞] denote the
threshold solving problem (3.11) for firm 1.13 Suppose x1M ≥ x2F . Then there exists a subgame-
perfect equilibrium with simultaneous investment above the threshold xJ ∈ [x2F , x1M ] iff
x1L ≥ x2F ⇔
I2
I1
≤ D11 −D01
(D10 −D00)+
or(
I2
I1
)β1−1[
1 +
(
x1L
xJ
)β1(
β1 − 1−
xJ
x1L
β1
D11 −D00
D10 −D00
)]
≤ β1
D10 −D11
D10 −D00
((D11 −D01)+
D10 −D00
)β1−1
(4.6)
with β1 > 1 from Proposition 4.2. The LHS of (4.6) is strictly positive and strictly decreasing
in xJ ∈ [x1L, x1M ] if x1L < x2F .
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Note that x1L < x2F implies D10 > D00. Then the second restriction on I2/I1 in the
proposition is weaker than the first if setting xJ = x1L, and it is further relaxed if xJ increases.
If xJ = x1M < ∞, then (4.6) coincides with the bound on I2/I1 identified by a graphical
argument in Pawlina and Kort (2006), who impose D11 > D00.14 Proposition 4.3 also applies
for D11 ≤ D00, when the firms end up worse after both having invested than before. Even
then it can be an equilibrium to invest simultaneously at some threshold xJ ∈ R+, although
it would be more favorable that both firms never invest at all.
Indeed, there may be many equilibria with “inefficient” joint investment in states above x2F
and where the expected joint investment payoff could be improved. If (D11 −D00)x2F < rI1,
13
x
1
M =
β1
β1−1 ·
I
1(r−µ)
D11−D00 if D11 > D00 and x
1
M =∞ else, cf. fn. 11.
14
x
1
M <∞⇔ D11 > D00 and then xJ = x1M implies xJ/x1L = (D10 −D00)/(D11 −D00).
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then the drift of M it is positive for states in the interval [x2F , rI1/(D11−D00)+), and hence it
is optimal to wait in any constrained version of problem (3.11). Therefore one can partition
the latter interval into arbitrary subintervals of alternating joint investment and waiting.
4.1.3 Sequential investment equilibria
Sequential investment may also be an equilibrium if the preemption region is non-empty, which
is a Pareto improvement compared to the equilibria of Pawlina and Kort (2006) if delayed
joint investment as in Section 4.1.2 is not feasible. Such an equilibrium can be verified by
Corollary 3.7 and it exists for the current specification iff firm 2 does not have a strict first-
mover advantage at x1L, where firm 1 invests.
Proposition 4.4. Consider the specification (4.1) and suppose x1L < x2F (whence D10 > D00).
Then there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium with firm 1 investing as soon as xt exceeds x1L
and firm 2 planning to invest when xt exceeds x2F iff x1L 6∈ (¯x, x¯) from Proposition 4.1, whichis iff
x1L ≥ x1F ⇔ D10 −D00 ≤ D11 −D01
or
(β1−1)
I2
I1
+
(
I2
I1
)1−β1((D11 −D01)+
D10 −D00
)β1
≥ β1
[
D10 −D01
D10 −D00
−D10 −D11
D10 −D00
((D11 −D01)+
D10 −D00
)β1−1]
(4.7)
with β1 > 1 from Proposition 4.2. The LHS of (4.7) is strictly increasing in I2/I1 and the
RHS strictly positive if x1L < x1F .
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Finally, there can be equilibria with sequential investment as in Proposition 4.4 or preemp-
tion as in Proposition 4.2 where the joint investment is delayed to some threshold xJ > x2F ,
such that firm 1 can optimize over larger intervals when to become leader. This may separate
the investment regions in the sequential equilibria into one where firm 1 invests as leader
and one where simultaneous investment occurs, with a gap in between. Such equilibria are
more difficult to characterize explicitly. If x2F is between two investment regions, the fol-
lower reaction has to be taken into account without the simplifications used in the previous
propositions.
4.1.4 Comparison of leader stopping regions
To illustrate the potentially strong impact of preemption on states in (x¯, x2F ) for varying
parameter values in Figure 1, the model is re-parameterized as follows. First, r, µ and σ
determine β1,2 and together with the ratio I1/(D11−D01) also firm 1’s follower threshold x1F ,
which we fix and which is an upper bound on x¯.
The distance between x¯ and x2F , which is the region where firm 1 can invest as leader,
is growing in I2. Indeed, x2F obviously grows with I2, and if the preemption region (¯
x, x¯) is
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Figure 1: Constrained leader stopping regions.
non-empty, it is strictly shrinking if I2 grows15; (
¯
x, x¯) collapses when I2/I1 = x2F /x1F reaches
a bound given in fn. 12 in terms of c = (D10 − D11)/(D11 − D01), the loss of a monopolist
relative to the gain of the follower when the latter invests. We pick those limit values for I2
and x2F for simplicity, thus making both functions of c, although then just ¯
x = x¯ = x2∆, the
threshold solving (3.8). Now c directly determines x¯ by x2∆ = x2F /(1 + c).
Equation (4.4) for xˆ can be reduced to the parameters β1,2 and x1L, the unconstrained
monopoly threshold, which is an upper bound on xˆ and itself satisfies x1L = x1F /(c + d) with
d := (D11−D00)/(D11−D01). The latter ratio comes close to 1 if the leader’s investment has
not much influence on the follower’s revenue, like in a market entry situation; it becomes small
when the leader steals considerable business from the follower, like by a drastic innovation. d
15Suppose x0 < x2F , such that firm 2’s first-mover advantage L20 − F 20 is non-trivial. If I2 is increased, that
has two negative effects on L20 − F 20 . First, it increases the investment cost stream e−rtrI2 up to firm 2’s
former follower investment time τ2F (0), which reduces L20. Second, it delays τ2F (0). The new revenue stream
difference e−rt(xt(D11−D01)−rI2) (with increased I2) between the former and the new τ2F (0) has non-positive
expectation by optimality of the new τ2F (0), and thus reduces L20 − F 20 .
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controls the best simultaneous investment threshold by x1M = x1F /d.
In the equilibria from Theorem 3.4, firm 1 can freely decide when to invest in the interval
(x¯, x2F ). Without the threat of preemption, it would not invest below min{x1L, x2F }. However,
given the threat of preemption, firm 1 already invests when the state exceeds xˆ, which may
be much earlier as Figure 1 shows. In the upper panel with a low value of d, the threat
of preemption strongly matters for c ≥ 0.45. Firm 1 never chooses to wait at all in the
lower panel with a moderate value of d. Joint investment at x1M is an equilibrium avoiding
preemption if x1L ≥ x2F ; it is not an equilibrium for d = 0.6 and c ≥ 0.45.
4.2 Strategic real estate development with construction time
Similar reasoning as before shows on the one hand that equilibria discussed in Grenadier
(1996) only exist under certain parameter restrictions, while on the other hand there exist
additional equilibria that are Pareto improvements.
Grenadier (1996) models a real option game between two symmetric real estate owners,
who may each invest to redevelop their property in order to earn higher rents. His model needs
a slight translation to fit into the current framework, since it includes a delay of construction:
if an owner invests, it takes δ ≥ 0 time units until the new building yields any revenues. Before
investment by any owner, both earn the deterministic rent R ≥ 0. Investment at cost I > 0
terminates that rent, reduces the rent of the opponent to (1−γ)R with γ ∈ [0, 1] and initiates
own new rent D1xt after the delay δ. (xt) is a geometric Brownian motion as in (4.2). Once
both new buildings are completed, each owner earns the rent D2xt with D2 ∈ (0, D1].
Grenadier’s model is strategically equivalent to specifying
pi0it = e−rtR, piLit = e−rt(D1e−(r−µ)δxt − rI),
piFit = e−rt(1− γ)R, piBit = e−rt(D2e−(r−µ)δxt − rI)
in the general framework. The equilibria proposed in Grenadier (1996) are justified by the
insufficient argument that waiting is optimal if the current follower payoff exceeds the current
leader payoff. Nevertheless there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium as in Theorem 3.4,
since Proposition 3.5 applies thanks to continuity; it can be characterized as follows. The
follower problems (2.1) are again solved by investing once xt exceeds a threshold xF > 0,
whence simultaneous investment is an equilibrium for all states xϑ ≥ xF .16 Problem (3.8) is
solved by a threshold x∆ = xFD2/D1 and the preemption region P is non-empty iff D2 < D1.
P can be represented by an interval (
¯
x, x¯) of the state space by the same arguments as in the
proof of Proposition 4.1, where now x¯ = xF .
Thus problem (3.4) only needs to be solved for states xϑ < ¯
x (also in case P = ∅, then
setting
¯
x = x¯ = xF ). Here piL1· − pi01· has the same structure as under the specification (4.1),
making Lemma A.4 apply again. It is now optimal to wait until the upper constraint
¯
x is
reached, since the present instance of the unconstrained problem (3.5) is solved by a threshold
16
xF =
β1(r−µ)
(β1−1)D2 e
(r−µ)δ(I + (1− γ)R/r) with β1 > 1 from fn. 11.
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xL ≥ x∆ ∈ [¯x, x¯] (with strict inequality iff γ > 0).
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4.2.1 Qualification of further equilibria
There may be other equilibria with delayed simultaneous investment and/or no preemption.
For states above x¯ = xF , any investment will induce the simultaneous investment payoff.
Contrarily to the claim made in Grenadier (1996), simultaneous investment cannot be delayed
past the threshold xM = xLD1/D2 ≥ xF solving problem (3.11). Indeed, in any equilibrium
with preemption in P, by symmetry now neither firm ever gets more than the follower payoff
at the time of investment. The same holds for any equilibrium with only joint investment. In
either case investment must occur as soon as the state exceeds xM , since any delay would be
a loss by Lemma 3.11.
With preemption occuring in the preemption region, one can only consider to delay si-
multaneous investment in the interval [x¯, xM ], i.e., to delay the revenue change piBit − pi0it =
e−rt(D2e−(r−µ)δxt−rI−R). This has the same form as the problem with two-sided constraint
considered in Proposition 4.2 (recall also the illustration in Section 4.1.4), with D2e−(r−µ)δ
replacing D10 −D00, I +R/r replacing I1 and xM replacing x2F . Thus, given now x¯ = xF , if
D2e
−(r−µ)δxF ≥ rI +R, which means if
γ ≤
(
rI
R
+ 1
)(
1− β1 − 1
β1(r − µ)
)
, (4.8)
then investment cannot be delayed at all for states above xF , which is ignored in Grenadier
(1996). In this case the preemption region extends to such high states that any foregone
revenue above it is a loss. Note that the RHS of (4.8) is strictly positive.
Only if (4.8) fails, there will exist a solution xˆ ∈ [(rI +R)e(r−µ)δ/D2, xM ) to the current
version of (4.4), such that investment can be held back in (xF , xˆ). Only then the phenomenon
discussed extensively in Section V of Grenadier (1996) can arise, that preemption occurs when
demand falls to xF .
However, if γ is sufficiently large to violate (4.8), then delayed joint investment may be
attractive enough to avoid preemption altogether, which will be a Pareto improvement w.r.t.
Grenadier (1996). By Proposition 3.6, preemption can be avoided in an equilibrium of joint
investment with the threshold xM ≥ xL iff the latter, which now solves problem (3.6), satisfies
xL ≥ xF ⇔ γ ≥
(
rI
R
+ 1
)(
1− D2
D1
)
(4.9)
or if Li0 ≤ E
[
M iτM
]
with τM := inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ≥ xM} holds for x0 = xL < xF 18, which is iff
γ ≥
(
rI
R
+ 1
)(
1−D2
(
β1
D1 −D2
D
β1
1 −Dβ12
) 1
β1−1
)
.
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xL =
β1(r−µ)
(β1−1)D1 e
(r−µ)δ(I+R/r) with β1 > 1 from fn. 11. This should not be confused with XL in Grenadier
(1996), which corresponds to the present
¯
x.
18For details, cf. the proof of Proposition 4.3 in Appendix A.2.
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The last restriction on γ is indeed weaker than the one in (4.9).
5 Conclusion
The equilibrium analysis of the general model in Section 3 was based directly on the com-
parison of revenue streams and not on derived analytic properties of value functions, as it
frequently happens in the growing literature on real option games. By that more general per-
spective, there is on the one hand less risk to neglect some verification problems for equilibria
and on the other hand the economic structure of equilibria becomes clearer. For models that
satisfy the general assumptions made here, the number of equilibrium verification problems
to be solved has been greatly reduced. By Theorem 3.4 it remains to solve a single class of
optimal stopping problems for one firm. It applies to many more examples from the literature
than the ones analyzed in Section 4 (e.g., to those listed in the Introduction). The presented
applications, which have quite distinctive economic properties, illustrate how the general re-
sults act in typical state-space models, to answer possibly neglected verification questions and
to identify equilibria without preemption that may be Pareto improvements.
Therefore the general model presented here provides a foundation for a more complete
analysis of (existing) preemptive investment models and a guideline for the analysis of further
models that do not satisfy the revenue orders assumed here.
A Appendix
A.1 Technical results
Lemma A.1. Let pi0, piL, piF and piB be adapted processes in L1(dt⊗P ), and {τF (ϑ) ∣∣ϑ ∈ T }
a family of stopping times satisfying ϑ ≤ τF (ϑ) ≤ τF (τ) a.s. for all ϑ, τ ∈ T with ϑ ≤ τ a.s.
Then there exist optional processes L = (Lt)t≥0 and F = (Ft)t≥0 that are of class (D) and
which satisfy
Lϑ = L(ϑ) :=
∫ ϑ
0
pi0(u) du+ E
[∫ τF (ϑ)
ϑ
piL(u) du+
∫ ∞
τF (ϑ)
piB(u) du
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
and
Fϑ = F (ϑ) :=
∫ ϑ
0
pi0(u) du+ ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[∫ τ
ϑ
piF (u) du+
∫ ∞
τ
piB(u) du
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
a.s. for every ϑ ∈ T . In particular, the process F can be chosen right-continuous. If
lim τF (ϑn) = τF (ϑ) a.s. for any ϑ ∈ T and sequence (ϑn)n∈N ⊂ T with ϑn ↘ ϑ a.s.,
then also L can be chosen right-continuous.
All conditions are met when letting each τF (ϑ) be the latest stopping time attaining the
value of F (ϑ).
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Proof. First rewrite F (ϑ) as
F (ϑ) =
∫ ϑ
0
(
pi0(u)− piF (u)) du+ E[∫ ∞
0
piB(u) du
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[∫ τ
0
(
piF (u)− piB(u)) du ∣∣∣∣Fϑ]. (A.1)
The first term on the RHS is obviously a continuous, adapted process evaluated at ϑ which is
bounded by
∫∞
0
(|pi0(u)| + |piF (u)|) du ∈ L1(P ), hence optional and of class (D). The second
and third terms are (super-)martingale-systems (cf. El Karoui (1981), Proposition 2.26) of
class (D), particularly the latter bounded by the family
{
E
[∫∞
0
(|piF (u)| + |piB(u)|) du ∣∣Fϑ] ∣∣
ϑ ∈ T } of class (D). Thus there exist optional processes of class (D) that aggregate the
two (super-)martingale-systems, respectively. The former, being a martingale, may be chosen
right-continuous. For the latter, we identify in fact the Snell envelope UY of the continuous
process Y :=
(∫ t
0
(
piF (u)− piB(u)) du)
t≥0, whence UY is (right-)continuous in expectation and
thus may be assumed to have right-continuous paths, a.s.
L(ϑ) has a decomposition analogous to (A.1) with a third term
X(ϑ) := E
[∫ τF (ϑ)
0
(
piL(u)− piB(u)) du ∣∣∣∣Fϑ].
Suppose first that piL(u)− piB(u) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ R+, a.s. In this case
E
[
X(τ)
∣∣Fϑ] = X(ϑ) + E[∫ τF (τ)
τF (ϑ)
(
piL(u)− piB(u)) du ∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
≥ X(ϑ)
for all stopping times τ ≥ ϑ (whence τF (ϑ) ≤ τF (τ)), so X :=
{
X(ϑ)
∣∣ ϑ ∈ T } is a
submartingale-system. X is bounded by
{
E
[∫∞
0
(|piL(u)| + |piB(u)|) du ∣∣ Fϑ] ∣∣ ϑ ∈ T },
hence of class (D). In general, the last argument applies separately to
(
piL(u) − piB(u))+
and
(
piL(u)− piB(u))−, showing that X is the difference of two submartingale-systems which
can be aggregated by two optional processes of class (D).
If lim τF (ϑn) = τF (ϑ) a.s. for any sequence (ϑn)n∈N ⊂ T with ϑn ↘ ϑ a.s., then X – being
of class (D) – is right-continuous in expectation and the aggregating submartingales can be
chosen with right-continuous paths.
As the process Y defined above is continuous, the latest stopping time after ϑ that attains
F (ϑ) is the first time the monotone part of the Snell envelope UY increases. That monotone
part inherits continuity from Y . Thus chosen, ϑ ≤ τF (ϑ) ≤ τF (τ) on {ϑ ≤ τ} for all ϑ, τ ∈ T .
Now consider a sequence of stopping times ϑn ↘ ϑ a.s., whence also τF (ϑn) decreases in n.
By construction we can only have lim τF (ϑn) > τF (ϑ) ≥ ϑ where the monotone part of UY is
constant on (τF (ϑ), lim τF (ϑn)]. By continuity it must then be constant on [τF (ϑ), lim τF (ϑn)].
The monotone part of UY increases at τF (ϑ) by definition, however, so we must have τF (ϑ) =
lim τF (ϑn) a.s.
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Remark A.2. Since the proof of Lemma A.1 relies on the aggregation of supermartingales of
class (D), we may further assume that the processes L and F have left (and right) limits at
any time t a.s.; see El Karoui (1981), Proposition 2.27.
Remark A.3. The solutions – and in particular the stopping regions – for the monopoly
problem (3.5) and the problem (3.9) of when to become optimally the leader typically differ.
Consider a model in which the profit streams are driven by a diffusion Y such that each firm
i has a follower threshold, say yiF solving (2.1) with τ iF (ϑ) = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≥ yiF }, and firm 1
also has a monopoly threshold, say y1L ≤ y1F solving (3.5), and where L1 can be represented
as a continuous function of the state process Y . Now one can apply arguments of Jacka
(1993) relying on the semi-martingale property of L1, which the proof of Lemma A.1 actually
establishes. Denote the finite-variation part of L1 by A. The Snell envelope S of L1, i.e., the
value process of optimally stopping L1, now is continuous (as a function of the state) as well
and its monotone decreasing part B is given by dBt = 1S=L1dAt +
1
2dL
0
t (S − L1). The last
term is the local time of S − L1 spent at 0 (i.e., in the stopping region), which is absolutely
continuous w.r.t. 1
S=L1dAt ≤ 0.
Now suppose the stopping region {S = L1} is that of the monopoly problem, {Y ≥ y1L},
whence dL0t (S − L1) lives on the boundary {Y = y1L}. For Yt ∈ [y1L, y2F ), L1 has a drift given
by the foregone monopoly profit stream, dAt = −piL1t dt, whence dL0t (S − L1) ≡ 0 if Y has a
transition density, cf. Theorem 6 of Jacka (1993).
As L1 is of class (D), so is S, which thus converges to S∞ = L1∞ = 0 in L1(P ) as t→∞.
Therefore the martingale part of S is simply E[−B∞ |Ft] and St = E[−
∫∞
t 1S=L1 dAs |Ft].
Noting further that for Yt > y2F , L1 has a drift given by the foregone duopoly stream, dAt =
−piB1t dt, we then obtain
St = E
[∫ ∞
t
(
1
Ys∈[y1L,y2F )pi
L1
s + 1Ys>y2F pi
B1
s
)
ds−
∫ ∞
t
1
Ys=y
2
F
dAs
∣∣∣∣Ft]. (A.2)
By applying similar reasoning to firm 1’s monopoly problem (3.5), which is solved by τ1L(t) =
inf{s ≥ t |Ys ≥ y1L}, its value is E
[∫∞
τ
1
L(t)
piL1s ds
∣∣ Ft] = E[∫∞t 1Ys≥y1LpiL1s ds ∣∣ Ft], i.e.,
E
[∫∞
τ
1
L(t)
1
Ys<y
1
L
piL1s ds
∣∣Ft] = 0. Thus, if Yt ≥ y1L, (A.2) can be rewritten as
St = E
[∫ ∞
t
(
1
Ys<y
2
F
piL1s + 1Ys>y2F pi
B1
s
)
ds−
∫ ∞
t
1
Ys=y
2
F
dAs
∣∣∣∣Ft].
In this hypothesized stopping region for L1, also St = L1t , in particular for Yt ≥ y2F ≥ y1L,
St = E
[∫ ∞
t
piB1s ds
∣∣∣∣Ft].
With y2F in the stopping region, −1Ys=y2F dAs ≥ 0, and by assumption pi
L1
· ≥ piB1· . Further,
1
Ys=y
2
F
is a P ⊗ dt nullset if Y has a transition density, such that equating the two last
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expressions for St implies indeed
E
[∫ ∞
t
1
Ys<y
2
F
(
piL1s − piB1s
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] = 0
(and E
[− ∫∞t 1Ys=y2F dAs ∣∣Ft] = 0). This contradicts the typical strict ordering piL1· > piB1· .
Lemma A.4. Let (xt)t≥0 be a geometric Brownian motion on
(
Ω,F , P
)
, satisfying
dxt = µxt dt+ σxt dBt
for a Brownian motion (Bt)t≥0 adapted to (Ft)t≥0. Further let τx˜ := inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ≥ x˜} for
any given constant x˜ ∈ R+. Then the problem
sup
τ∈T , τ≤τx˜
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rt(Dxt − rI) dt
]
(A.3)
with r > max{µ, 0}, D ∈ R and I > 0 is solved by τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ≥ x˜ ∧ x∗}, where
x∗ = β1
β1 − 1
· I(r − µ)
D+
and β1 > 1 is the positive root of 12σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0.
Proof. IfD ≤ 0, then the integrand in (A.3) is always negative and the lastest feasible stopping
time is optimal, which indeed satisfies τx˜ = τ∗ since now x∗ =∞. For D > 0, Lemma A.4 is
a special case of Proposition 4.6 in Steg and Thijssen (2015), setting their Y0 = Dx0, µY = µ,
σY = σ, X0 = c0 = cB = 0 and yP = (r − µY )(I − cA/r) = x˜.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We only use the assumptions piLi· ≥ piBi· and pi0i· ≥ piFi· (except for
the representation with τP(ϑ)). Let τ i1st(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lit > F it } (= τP(ϑ) for i = 2), such
that by right-continuity Li· ≥ F i· at τ i1st(ϑ). Also Li· ≥ F i· at τ iF (ϑ) by piLi· ≥ piBi· . Next, by
the optimality of τ iF (ϑ) in F iϑ and pi0i· ≥ piFi· , (F it ) is a submartingale on [ϑ, τ iF (ϑ)]. Hence i
prefers to become follower as late as possible on that interval. On [ϑ, τ i1st(ϑ)), M it ≤ Lit ≤ F it ,
so stopping is nowhere better, but inferior if the last inequality is strict. All claims now follow
from the follower value at min
{
τ i1st(ϑ), τ iF (ϑ)
}
being indeed attainable (in expectation) for
any strategy of the opponent j: At min
{
τ i1st(ϑ), τ iF (ϑ)
}
, the limit payoff to i of stopping ever
quicklier after is at least F i· since Li· ≥ F i· and (Lit) is right-continuous (in the limit, i obtains
F i· with the probability that j stops immediately and Li· with the probability that j does not
stop immediately).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Firm i’s payoff from τ i ≡ ∞ is E[F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ′] ≥ E[M iτ j∗1τ i∗=τ j∗ +
F i
τ
j
∗
1
τ
i
∗>τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ′] for any τ i∗ ≥ τ j∗ , with equality iff F iτ j∗ = M iτ j∗ on {τ i∗ = τ j∗}. Thus τ i∗ is a best
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reply to τ j∗ iff the latter condition holds and τ = τ j∗ attains
ess sup
ϑ≤τ≤τ j∗
E
[
Liτ1τ<τj∗ + F
i
τ
j
∗
1
τ≥τ j∗
∣∣∣Fϑ].
By iterated expectations, this is equivalent to Li
ϑ
′ − E[F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ′] ≤ 0 on {ϑ′ < τ j∗} for all
stopping times ϑ′ ≥ ϑ. To establish the latter under conditions (i) and (ii), fix arbitrary
ϑ′ ≥ ϑ and let τ iD(ϑ′) ∈ T attain (3.6) (such τ iD(ϑ′) exists by continuity and integrability of
the process to be stopped), whence E
[∫ τ iD(ϑ′)
ϑ
′ (piLis − pi0is ) ds
∣∣Fϑ′] ≤ 0. Then, on {ϑ′ < τ j∗} we
have
Li
ϑ
′ − E
[
M i
τ
j
∗
∣∣∣Fϑ′] = E[∫ τ
j
F (ϑ
′)
ϑ
′ (pi
Li
s − pi0is ) ds+
∫ τ j∗
τ
j
F (ϑ
′)
(piBis − pi0is ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′] (A.4)
≤ E
[∫ τ jF (ϑ′)∨τ iD(ϑ′)
ϑ
′ (pi
Li
s − pi0is ) ds+
∫ τ j∗
τ
j
F (ϑ
′)∨τ iD(ϑ′)
(piBis − pi0is ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′]
≤ E
[∫ τ jF (ϑ′)∨τ iD(ϑ′)
τ
i
D(ϑ
′)
(piLis − pi0is ) ds+
∫ τ j∗
τ
j
F (ϑ
′)∨τ iD(ϑ′)
(piBis − pi0is ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′]
= E
[
1
τ
i
D(ϑ
′)<τ jF (ϑ
′)
(
Li
τ
i
D(ϑ
′) −M
i
τ
j
∗
)
+ 1
τ
i
D(ϑ
′)≥τ jF (ϑ′)
(
M i
τ
i
D(ϑ
′) −M
i
τ
j
∗
)∣∣∣Fϑ′].
The first equality uses the convention
∫ a
b · ds = −
∫ b
a · ds for a < b. The first inequality is due
to piLi· ≥ piBi· and the second due to the optimality of τ iD(ϑ′). The last equality is analogous
to the first, using iterated expectations and τ iD(ϑ′) < τ jF (ϑ
′) ⇒ τ jF (τ iD(ϑ′)) = τ jF (ϑ′). After
replacing M i
τ
j
∗
by F i
τ
j
∗
in the first and last terms of (A.4), conditions (i) and (ii) make the last
non-positive (taking iterated expectations at τ iD(ϑ′)) and thus also Liϑ′ − E
[
F i
τ
j
∗
∣∣Fϑ′] ≤ 0.
To prove the next claim, note that for any stopping time τ ∈ [ϑ′, τ jF (ϑ′)] we have τ jF (τ) =
τ jF (ϑ
′) and thus Li
ϑ
′ − E[Liτ ∣∣Fϑ′] = E[∫ τϑ′(piLis − pi0is ) ds ∣∣Fϑ′] ≥ 0 where ϑ′ attains (3.6).
For the final claim consider any stopping time τ2∗ ≥ ϑ such that F 2τ2∗ = M
2
τ
2
∗
; then also
F 1
τ
2
∗
= M1
τ
2
∗
by Lemma 3.1. Suppose further that (i), (ii) hold for i = 1, so τ1∗ = τ2∗ is a best
reply for firm 1. To prove that τ2∗ is a best reply for firm 2 to τ1∗ = τ2∗ if piL1· −pi01· ≥ piL2· −pi02·
and piB1· − pi01· ≥ piB2· − pi02· , we show that now (A.4) for firm 2 is not greater than for firm
1. Therefore first note that for each i = 1, 2, F i
τ
2
∗
= M i
τ
2
∗
implies E
[
1A
∫ τ iF (ϑ′)
τ
2
∗
(piBis − piFis ) ds
∣∣
Fϑ′
]
= 0 for any set A ⊂ {τ iF (ϑ′) ≥ τ2∗ } (taking iterated expectations at τ2∗ ), so in particular
for A = {τ1F (ϑ′) > τ2∗ } as τ2F (ϑ′) ≥ τ1F (ϑ′). Since further E
[
1
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)>τ2∗
∫ τ2F (ϑ′)
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)
(piB2s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣
Fϑ′
] ≤ 0 by optimality of τ2F (ϑ′) (and taking iterated expectations at τ1F (ϑ′)), we also have
E
[
1
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)>τ2∗
∫ τ1F (ϑ′)
τ
2
∗
(piB2s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣Fϑ′] ≥ 0.
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Now, rewriting (A.4) for i = 2, we obtain
E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ′)∧τ2∗
ϑ
′ (pi
L2
s − pi02s ) ds+ 1τ1F (ϑ′)≤τ2∗
∫ τ2∗
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)
(piB2s − pi02s ) ds
+1
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)>τ2∗
∫ τ1F (ϑ′)
τ
2
∗
(piL2s − piB2s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′]
≤ E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ′)∧τ2∗
ϑ
′ (pi
L1
s − pi01s ) ds+ 1τ1F (ϑ′)≤τ2∗
∫ τ2∗
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)
(piB1s − pi01s ) ds
+1
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)>τ2∗
∫ τ1F (ϑ′)
τ
2
∗
(piL2s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′]
≤ E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ′)∧τ2∗
ϑ
′ (pi
L1
s − pi01s ) ds+ 1τ1F (ϑ′)≤τ2∗
∫ τ2∗
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)
(piB1s − pi01s ) ds
+1
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)>τ2∗
∫ τ1F (ϑ′)
τ
2
∗
(piL1s − piF1s ) ds
+
∫ τ2F (ϑ′)
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)
(piL1s − piB1s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ′] (A.5)
The last inequality uses the standing assumption piL1· − piF1· ≥ piL2· − piF2· , as well as τ1F (ϑ′) ≤
τ2F (ϑ′) and piL1· ≥ piB1· . Rearranging (A.5) using E
[
1
τ
1
F (ϑ
′)>τ2∗
∫ τ iF (ϑ′)
τ
2
∗
(piBis − piFis ) ds
∣∣Fϑ] = 0
yields (A.4) for i = 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.7. We only need to verify optimality for firm i = 2 by applying Propo-
sition 3.6 with τ1∗ = τS ≤ τ2F (ϑ) = τ2∗ . Then indeed F 2τ2∗ = M
2
τ
2
∗
. Further, condition (i) is
satisfied since M2· ≤ F 2· and (F 2t ) is a submartingale on [ϑ, τ2F (ϑ)] by piF2· ≤ pi02· . Hence τ2∗ is
optimal if the remaining condition (ii) is satisfied.
For the second claim note that if piL1· −pi01· ≥ piL2· −pi02· , then E
[∫ τS
τ (pi
L2
s −pi02s ) ds
∣∣Fτ ] ≤
E
[∫ τS
τ (pi
L1
s − pi01s ) ds
∣∣Fτ ] ≤ 0 for any stopping time τ ∈ [ϑ, τS ] by the optimality of τS , cf.
Lemma 3.10, and thus τ2D(ϑ′) = τS ∨ ϑ′ attains the current instance of (3.6).
Proof of Lemma 3.8. First note that there are solutions τ i∆ ≤ τ iF (ϑ) ≤ τ2F (ϑ) to (3.8) for
i = 1, 2, since the respective process to be stopped is continuous and integrable. The estimate
follows from the assumption piLi· − piFi· ≥ piBi· − piFi· , cf. the proof of Lemma 3.1.
By the optimality of τ i∆ in (3.8), E
[∫ τ i∆
ϑ (pi
Li
s −piFis ) ds
∣∣Fϑ] ≤ 0. Therefore, as piL2· −piF2· ≤
piLi· − piFi· , (3.1) can only be strictly positive if
E
[∫ τ1F (ϑ)
τ
i
∆
(piL2s − piF2s ) ds+
∫ τ2F (ϑ)
τ
1
F (ϑ)
(piB2s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] > 0
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(which can in fact only be the case if P [τ i∆ < τ1F (ϑ)] > 0), and which implies
E
[
L2
τ
i
∆
− F 2
τ
i
∆
∣∣∣Fϑ] = E[∫ τ1F (τ i∆)
τ
i
∆
(piL2s − piF2s ) ds+
∫ τ2F (ϑ)
τ
1
F (τ
i
∆)
(piB2s − piF2s ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] > 0
as τ1F (τ i∆) ≥ τ1F (ϑ), τ2F (τ i∆) = τ2F (ϑ) and piL2· ≥ piB2· .
For all stopping times τ ∈ [ϑ, τ1F (ϑ)], indeed τ iF (τ) = τ iF (ϑ), i = 1, 2, and thus L2ϑ − F 2ϑ −
E
[
L2τ − F 2τ
∣∣Fϑ] = E[∫ τϑ (piL2s − piF2s ) ds ∣∣Fϑ] ≥ 0 if τ2∆ = ϑ attains (3.8).
Proof of Lemma 3.9. For the first claim suppose wlog. that τ il = ϑ is attaining (3.9) for
some given ϑ ∈ T and maximal, i.e., Liϑ > E
[
Liτ
∣∣ Fϑ] (up to a P -nullset) on {τ > ϑ}
for any other τ ∈ T . Then we must also have Liϑ ≥ E
[
F iτ
∣∣Fϑ] on {τ ≥ ϑ}, strictly on
{τ > ϑ}, as follows. First note that F iτ −E
[
F i
τ
i
F (τ)
∣∣Fτ ] = E[∫ τ iF (τ)τ (piFis −pi0is ) ∣∣Fτ ] ≤ 0, since
τ iF (τ iF (τ)) = τ iF (τ). Furthermore, note that Liτ iF (τ) ≥ F
i
τ
i
F (τ)
by piLi· ≥ piBi· . Together with the
hypothesis it must thus hold that Liϑ > E
[
F iτ
∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[M iτ ∣∣Fϑ] on {τ > ϑ} for any τ ∈ T ,
and Liϑ ≥ F iϑ ≥M iϑ using τ = ϑ.
Then, in case that the opponent j’s strategy does not imply immediate stopping with
probability 1 (else there is nothing to prove), i cannot achieve a higher payoff than Liϑ with
the probability that j does not stop immediately and F iϑ with the probability that j stops
immediately.19 This upper bound is the limit of i stopping ever quicklier after ϑ (say, at
ϑ+ 1/n, with n↗∞) since (Lit) is right-continuous (cf. fn. 3), but it is not attainable by any
strategy not inducing immediate stopping with probability 1.
For the second claim suppose now by way of contradiction that τ il = ϑ attains (3.9), but
that there exists a stopping time τ ≥ ϑ with
E
[∫ ∞
ϑ
piLis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] < E[∫ τ
ϑ
pi0is ds+
∫ ∞
τ
piLis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] ⇔ E[∫ τ
ϑ
(piLis − pi0is ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] < 0
with positive probability. Then
Liϑ =
∫ ϑ
0
pi0is ds+ E
[∫ τ jF (ϑ)
ϑ
piLis ds+
∫ ∞
τ
j
F (ϑ)
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
<
∫ ϑ
0
pi0is ds+ E
[∫ τ
ϑ
pi0is ds+
∫ τ jF (ϑ)
τ
piLis ds+
∫ ∞
τ
j
F (ϑ)
piBis ds
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
≤ E
[
Liτ
∣∣∣Fϑ],
since τ jF (τ) ≥ τ jF (ϑ) and piLi· ≥ piBi· , contradicting the hypothesized optimality of ϑ for (3.9).
Hence ϑ must also be optimal for the permanent monopoly problem.
19This phrasing accounts for a possible coordination device for immediate stopping. With an extended mixed
strategy that is used to model preemption in Section 3.1.2, j can induce the game to end immediately with
probability 1 for all strategies of i, but i may obtain a different payoff than F iϑ.
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Proof of Lemma 3.10. First note that there exists an optimal stopping time for (3.10) (and
also a latest one), because the process to be stopped is continuous and integrable. For any
stopping time τ ∈ [ϑ, τ2F (ϑ)], τ2F (τ) = τ2F (ϑ) and thus L1ϑ −E
[
L1τ
∣∣Fϑ] = E[∫ τϑ (piL1s − pi01s ) ds ∣∣
Fϑ
]
is the same payoff difference as that between ϑ and τ in (3.10). Thus, where ϑ is uniquely
optimal in (3.10), there also L1ϑ > E
[
L1τ
∣∣ Fϑ] on {τ > ϑ}. Regarding the other possible
payoffs, as argued in the proof of Lemma 3.9, M1τ ≤ F 1τ ≤ E
[
F 1
τ
1
F (τ)
∣∣Fτ ] ≤ E[L1τ1F (τ) ∣∣Fτ ],
where now τ1F (τ) ≤ τ2F (τ) = τ2F (ϑ) for τ ∈ [ϑ, τ2F (ϑ)]. Hence L1ϑ is strictly superior to any
future payoff on (ϑ, τ2F (ϑ)] and the game has to end by the same arguments as in the proof of
Lemma 3.9.
Proof of Lemma 3.11. First note that there exists an optimal stopping time τ iM ≥ ϑ for
(3.11) and also a latest one, because the process to be stopped is continuous and integrable.
An optimal τ iM satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions E
[∫ τ iM
τ (pi
0i
s − piBis ) ds
∣∣Fτ ] ≥ 0
on {τ ≤ τ iM} and E
[∫ τ
τ
i
M
(pi0is − piBis ) ds
∣∣F
τ
i
M
] ≤ 0 on {τ ≥ τ iM} for all stopping times τ ≥ ϑ,
the last inequality being strict on {τ > τ iM} if τ iM is the latest solution. We will derive the
analogous properties for the process (F it ); thus consider an arbitrary stopping time τ ≥ ϑ.
For the first property, note that on {τ ≤ τ iM} we have
E
[
F i
τ
i
M∧τ iF (τ)
∣∣Fτ ]− F iτ = E[∫ τ iM∧τ iF (τ)
τ
(pi0is − piFis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≥ 0
by pi0i· ≥ piFi· and τ iF (τ iM ∧ τ iF (τ)) = τ iF (τ). Further, on the subset {τ iM > τ iF (τ)} we have
E
[
F i
τ
i
M
∣∣F
τ
i
F (τ)
]− F i
τ
i
F (τ)
= E
[∫ τ iM
τ
i
F (τ)
(pi0is − piBis ) ds+
∫ τ iF (τ iM )
τ
i
M
(piFis − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ iF (τ)
]
≥ 0
by the optimality of τ iM and the definition of τ iF (τ iM ), cf. the proof of Lemma 3.1. Together,
E
[
F i
τ
i
M
∣∣Fτ ]− F iτ = E[F iτ iM − F iτ iM∧τ iF (τ) ∣∣Fτ ]+ E[F iτ iM∧τ iF (τ) ∣∣Fτ ]− F iτ ≥ 0.
For the second property, note that E
[
F i
τ
i
F (τ)
∣∣Fτ ]−F iτ = E[∫ τ iF (τ)τ (pi0is − piFis ) ds ∣∣Fτ ] ≥ 0,
again by pi0i· ≥ piFi· and τ iF (τ iF (τ)) = τ iF (τ), hence it is sufficient to show E
[
F i
τ
i
F (τ)
∣∣F
τ
i
M
] ≤ F i
τ
i
M
on {τ ≥ τ iM}. There, where τ iF (τ) ≥ τ iF (τ iM ), it holds that
E
[
F i
τ
i
F (τ)
∣∣F
τ
i
M
]− F i
τ
i
M
= E
[∫ τ iF (τ iM )
τ
i
M
(pi0is − piFis ) ds+
∫ τ iF (τ)
τ
i
F (τ
i
M )
(pi0is − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ iM
]
≤ E
[∫ τ iF (τ iM )
τ
i
M
(pi0is − piBis ) ds+
∫ τ iF (τ)
τ
i
F (τ
i
M )
(pi0is − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ iM
]
≤ 0,
where we have used the definition of τ iF (τ iM ) in the first estimate, and the optimality of τ iM
in the last. The last inequality is strict on {τ > τ iM} if τ iM is the latest solution of (3.11).
Now suppose that the stopping time τ iM ≥ ϑ optimally stops (F it ) from ϑ ∈ T , i.e., it
satisfies E
[
F i
τ
i
M
∣∣Fτ ] ≥ F iτ on {τ ≤ τ iM} and E[F iτ ∣∣Fτ iM ] ≤ F iτ iM on {τ ≥ τ iM} for all stopping
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times τ ≥ ϑ. Since E[F i
τ
i
F (τ
i
M )
∣∣F
τ
i
M
] ≥ F i
τ
i
M
as noted above, we must then have equality, i.e.,
τ iF (τ iM ) is optimal, too, and we may set τ iM = τ iF (τ iM ) for simplicity to show optimality of
τ iF (τ iM ) in (3.11). Therefore, consider again an arbitrary stopping time τ ≥ ϑ.
On {τ ≤ τ iM}, where τ iF (τ) ≤ τ iF (τ iM ) = τ iM , it then holds that
0 ≤ E[F i
τ
i
M
∣∣Fτ ]− F iτ = E[∫ τ iF (τ)
τ
(pi0is − piFis ) ds+
∫ τ iM
τ
i
F (τ)
(pi0is − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
≤ E
[∫ τ iF (τ)
τ
(pi0is − piBis ) ds+
∫ τ iM
τ
i
F (τ)
(pi0is − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
by the definition of τ iF (τ), which yields the first optimality property for τ iM in (3.11).
On {τ ≥ τ iM}, where τ iF (τ) ≥ τ iM , we have
0 ≥ E[F iτ ∣∣Fτ iM ]− F iτ iM = E
[∫ τ
τ
i
M
(pi0is − piBis ) ds+
∫ τ iF (τ)
τ
(piFis − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ iM
]
≥ E
[∫ τ
τ
i
M
(pi0is − piBis ) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ iM
]
again by the definition of τ iF (τ), which yields the second optimality property for τ iM in (3.11).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By the strong Markov property it suffices to consider t = 0. If
the preemption region is empty, one can set
¯
x = x¯ and pick any number in (0, x1F ]. The upper
and lower bounds for a non-empty preemption region are obtained as follows. First note that
L20 = M20 ≤ F 20 for all x0 ≥ x1F . Second, for all x0 > 0, L20 ≤ E
[∫∞
0 e
−rs(xsD10 − rI2) ds] =
x0D10/(r − µ)− I2 by D10 ≥ D11 and F 20 ≥ E
[∫∞
0 e
−rsxsD01 ds
]
= x0D01/(r − µ), the value
of never investing as follower. Thus, L20 − F 20 ≤ x0(D10 − D01)/(r − µ) − I2 ≤ 0 on the
non-empty interval (0, (r − µ)I2/(D10 −D01)+).
Now suppose L20 > F 20 for some x0 = xˆ ∈ (0, x1F ) and also for some x0 = xˇ < xˆ, and assume
by way of contradiction that L20 ≤ F 20 for x0 = x′ ∈ (xˇ, xˆ). Then we must have x′ > rI2/(D10−
D01)+, because otherwise L20 − F 20 = E
[∫ τ ′
0 e
−rs(xs(D10 −D01)− rI2) ds]+E[L2τ ′ − F 2τ ′] ≤ 0
if x0 = xˇ and x′ ∈ (xˇ, rI2/(D10 − D01)+ ∧ x1F ], where τ ′ := inf{s ≥ 0 |xs ≥ x′} ≤ τ1F (0).
By the same argument, we must also have L20 > F 20 for x0 = xˇ ∨ rI2/(D10 − D01) < x′.
But then, if we set x0 = x′ and τˆ := inf{s ≥ 0 |xs 6∈ (xˇ ∨ rI2/(D10 − D01), xˆ)} ≤ τ1F (0),
we obtain L20 − F 20 = E
[∫ τˆ
0 e
−rs(xs(D10 −D01)− rI2) ds]+ E[L2τˆ − F 2τˆ ] > 0, whence the set
{x > 0 |L20 > F 20 given x0 = x} is convex. Further, that set is open since L20−F 20 is continuous
in x0.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. x¯ < x2F can be any two numbers from [0,∞] in this proof, i.e.,
we only assume x¯ finite. For initial states x0 ∈ (x¯, x2F ), the constraint τP(0)∧τ2F (0) in problem
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(4.3) is the exit time from the given interval and (4.3) is equivalent to
sup
τ≤inf{s≥0 |xs 6∈(x¯,x2F )}
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
. (A.6)
If x¯(D10 − D00) ≥ rI1, the expected payoff difference between stopping at time 0 and any
feasible τ ≥ 0 is E[∫ τ0 e−rs(xs(D10 − D00) − rI1) ds] ≥ 0, such that immediate stopping is
optimal. If D10 − D00 ≤ 0, also E
[∫ τP (0)∧τ2F (0)
τ e
−rs(xs(D10 − D00) − rI1) ds
] ≤ 0 for any
τ ≤ τP(0) ∧ τ2F (0), such that waiting until the constraint is optimal.
Now suppose 0 < x¯(D10 −D00) < rI1, whence D10 > D00 and x1L <∞. Note that
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
= x0
D10 −D00
r − µ − I
1
is the value of stopping immediately in (A.6). Letting x0 = x, we will first verify that the
value function of problem (A.6) is
V (x) :=
A(xˆ)x
β1 +B(xˆ)xβ2 if x ∈ (x¯, xˆ),
xD10−D00r−µ − I1 else,
(A.7)
and thus (x¯, xˆ)c the sought stopping region, under the hypothesis that either xˆ ∈ [rI1/(D10−
D00), x2F ) solves (4.4) or “≤” holds for xˆ = x2F . Afterwards we will establish existence of a
unique such xˆ.
V (x) as defined in (A.7) is continuous because A(xˆ) and B(xˆ) given by (4.5) are the
solution to the continuity conditions
Ax¯β1 +Bx¯β2 = x¯D10 −D00
r − µ − I
1,
Axˆβ1 +Bxˆβ2 = xˆD10 −D00
r − µ − I
1. (A.8)
V (x) is also twice continuously differentiable on (x¯, x2F ), except possibly at xˆ. At xˆ < x2F ,
the first derivative of V is continuous, however, because (4.4) is the differentiability condition
β1Axˆ
β1−1 +β2Bxˆβ2−1 = (D10−D00)/(r−µ) multiplied by xˆ, minus the second continuity con-
dition in (A.8). Therefore one can apply Ito¯’s lemma to see that (e−rtV (xt)) is a continuous,
bounded supermartingale until τ = inf{t ≥ 0 |xt 6∈ (x¯, x2F )}, with zero drift for xt ∈ (x¯, xˆ) and
drift e−rt(rI1−xt(D10−D00)) dt < 0 for xt ∈ (xˆ, x2F ). As that supermartingale coincides with
the payoff process at τ = inf{t ≥ 0 |xt 6∈ (x¯, x2F )}, it remains to show that V (x) dominates
the payoff process for x ∈ (x¯, x2F ), which it does by construction for x ∈ [xˆ, x2F ].
For x ∈ (x¯, xˆ), V ′′(x) = xβ2−2[β1(β1−1)A(xˆ)xβ1−β2 +β2(β2−1)B(xˆ)]. As βk(βk−1) > 0,
k = 1, 2, the difference V (x)−x(D10−D00)/(r−µ)+I1 would be convex if A(xˆ), B(xˆ) ≥ 0, and
it vanishes at both ends x¯, xˆ. By (4.4), that difference’s derivative is non-positive at xˆ, where
the difference would thus take its minimum. Hence it would vanish on all of [x¯, xˆ], but V (x)
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cannot be affine on non-empty (x¯, xˆ). So we must have A(xˆ)∧B(xˆ) < 0. If we had B(xˆ) ≥ 0,
then A(xˆ) < 0 and V (x) would be strictly decreasing on (x¯, xˆ), contradicting V (xˆ) ≥ V (x¯);
thus B(xˆ) < 0. Going back to V ′′(x), which can switch sign at most once, it must start strictly
negative at x¯. If it stays non-positive, the difference V (x)−x(D10−D00)/(r−µ)+I1 is concave
and thus non-negative on (x¯, xˆ). If V ′′(x) eventually becomes positive, then the convex part
of V (x)−x(D10−D00)/(r−µ) + I1 takes its minimum 0 at xˆ as argued before, such that the
difference is non-negative at the transition, and thus non-negative for the first, concave part.
In summary, (e−rtV (xt)) is a supermartingale until xt leaves (x¯, x2F ), dominating the payoff
e−rt(xt(D10 −D00)/(r − µ)− I1), which it coincides with for xt ∈ {x¯} ∪ [xˆ, x2F ], so the latter
is the stopping set in [x¯, x2F ].
Next, we show that there is a unique threshold xˆ ∈ [rI1/(D10 − D00), x1L) solving (4.4),
and then finally consider the constraint x2F .
As the first step, note that B(x) < 0 in (4.5) for all x ∈ (x¯, x1L]. Indeed, as the first
term
[
x¯β1xβ2 − xβ1 x¯β2]−1 < 0 for x > x¯ by β1 > 1 and β2 < 0, we have B(x) < 0 ⇔
x−β1
[
x(D10 −D00)/(r − µ) − I1
]
> x¯−β1
[
x¯(D10 −D00)/(r − µ) − I1
]
. The derivative of the
latter function of x can be written as x−β1−1
[
β1I
1 − (β1 − 1)x(D10 −D00)/(r − µ)
]
> 0 for
all x < x1L = β1(r − µ)I1/((β1 − 1)(D10 −D00)).
As the second step, note that with A = A(x1L) and B = B(x1L), we have A · (x1L)β1 + B ·
(x1L)β2 = I1/(β1−1) by using the definition of x1L in (A.8), and thus (β1−1)A · (x1L)β1 +(β2−
1)B · (x1L)β2 = I1 + (β2 − β1)B · (x1L)β2 > I1 compared to “=” in (4.4).
The third step is to show that “≤” holds in (4.4) for the candidate xˆ = rI1/(D10−D00) ∈
(x¯, x2F ), where the inclusion is exactly the current considered case. By similar arguments as
above, using the continuity condition (A.8), V (x) then satisfies
V (x) = E
[∫ ∞
τˆ
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
, x0 = x ∈ [x¯, xˆ],
where we let τˆ := inf{s ≥ 0 |xs 6∈ (x¯, xˆ)}. For xˆ = rI1/(D10 − D00), the integrand would
be strictly negative until τˆ , so V (x) > x(D10 − D00)/(r − µ) − I1 for all x ∈ (x¯, xˆ). At
x = xˆ, however, equality holds by (A.8) and thus V ′(xˆ−) = β1A(xˆ)xˆβ1−1 + β2B(xˆ)xˆβ2−1 ≤
(D10 −D00)/(r − µ). Together with (A.8), the latter inequality implies also “≤” in (4.4).
As the last step, since the function (β1 − 1)A(x)xβ1 + (β2 − 1)B(x)xβ2 is continuous, it
must attain I1 at some xˆ ∈ [rI1/(D10 −D00), x1L) by the second and third steps. The latter
interval is non-empty by the estimate for x1L at the beginning of the proof.
Concerning uniqueness, suppose xˆ1, xˆ2 ∈ [rI1/(D10 − D00), x1L) solve (4.4). With either
solution, as we have proved above, V (x) is the value function of problem (A.6) for any x2F ≥ x1L,
and (A.6) is solved by both τˆk := inf{s ≥ 0 |xs 6∈ (x¯, xˆk)}, k = 1, 2. In particular, for any
x0 ∈ [x1, x2],
V (x0) = x0
D10 −D00
r − µ − I
1 = E
[∫ ∞
τˆ2
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
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⇒ 0 = E
[∫ τˆ2
0
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
.
Thus, letting τˇ1 := inf{s ≥ 0 |xs ≤ xˆ1} ≤ τˆ2 and still x0 ∈ [x1, x2],
0 = E
[∫ τˆ2
0
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
= E
[∫ τˇ1∧τˆ2
0
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds+
∫ τˆ2
τˇ1∧τˆ2
e−rs
(
xs(D10 −D00)− rI1
)
ds
]
.
The second integral vanishes itself in expectation, while the first integrand is strictly positive
for xs ∈ (xˆ1, xˆ2). Therefore the latter interval must be empty.
The proof is complete for xˆ ≤ x2F . Finally, if rI1/(D10 − D00) < x2F < xˆ, then the
“≤” in (4.4) that we derived above for the candidate x = rI1/(D10 − D00) must be strict,
and thus also “<” must hold in (4.4) for x2F , because otherwise xˆ ≤ x2F by continuity of
(β1−1)A(x)xβ1 +(β2−1)B(x)xβ2 . Now the verification argument above applies if we consider
instead xˆ := x2F with “≤” in (4.4).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The stopping times τJ(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |xt ≥ xJ}, ϑ ∈ T ,
satisfy time consistency ϑ′ ≤ τJ(ϑ)⇒ τJ(ϑ′) = τJ(ϑ) for any two ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T by construction.
τJ(ϑ) is a mutual best reply at ϑ if the conditions from Proposition 3.6 hold. By xJ ≥ x2F ,
F 2τJ (ϑ) = M
2
τJ (ϑ). Under the current specification it suffices to verify conditions (i) and (ii) for
firm 1.
Condition (i) holds since waiting until the threshold xJ ≤ x1M is optimal for the con-
strained problem of stopping M1t up to it by Lemma A.4; cf. the unconstrained problem
(3.11). Analogously, the threshold min{xJ , x1L} solves problem (3.6). Thus condition (ii)
holds if x1L ≥ x2F or, using the strong Markov property, if 0 ≥ DJ(x) := L10−E
[
M1τJ (0)
]
given
x0 = x ∈ [x1L, x2F ).
By Proposition 3.6, if x1L < x2F solves (3.6) and we let τ(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ≥ x} ≤ τ2F (0)
for any x ∈ [x1L, x2F ), then DJ(x1L) ≥ E
[
L1τ(x) −M1τJ (0)
]
= E[DJ(x)], where the last identity
is due to xτ(x) = x. Therefore it remains to verify DJ(x1L) ≤ 0 for x1L < x2F .
If x1L < x2F , the former is finite and we can write λ := xJ/x1L ∈ [1,∞]. Then also x1L < xJ
and thus (cf. equations (9), (10) in Pawlina and Kort (2006), accounting for possibly x2F =∞)
DJ(x1L) =
x1LD10
r − µ − I
1 − x
2
F (D10 −D11)
r − µ
(
x1L
x2F
)β1
− x
1
LD00
r − µ −
(
xJ(D11 −D00)
r − µ − I
1
)(
x1L
xJ
)β1
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= β1
β1 − 1
I1 − I1 − β1
β1 − 1
I1
D10 −D11
D10 −D00
(
I1
I2
(D11 −D01)+
D10 −D00
)β1−1
−
(
λ
β1
β1 − 1
I1
D11 −D00
D10 −D00
− I1
)
λ−β1
!≤ 0.
Rearranging yields the condition (4.6). The derivative of the square bracket in (4.6) w.r.t.
λ is strictly negative for λ ∈ (0, x1M/x1L) given β1 > 1, where it is important to note that
λ(D11 −D00) < D10 −D00, because D10 > D00 for x1L < x2F and (D10 −D00)/(D11 −D00) =
x1M/x
1
L > λ if D11 > D00. Using the latter fact also shows that for λ = x1M/x1L, the square
bracket is either 1− (x1L/x1M )β1 ≥ 0 or 1, if x1M is finite or not, respectively.
Finally, necessity of DJ(x1L) ≤ 0 for x1L < x2F ≤ xJ is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By the hypothesis x1L < x2F and Lemmata 3.10 and A.4, problem
(3.7) is solved by τS(ϑ) := τ1L(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ ϑ |xt ≥ x1L} ∈ T for any ϑ ∈ T . These stopping
times for firm 1 satisfy time consistency ϑ′ ≤ τS(ϑ)⇒ τS(ϑ′) = τS(ϑ) for any two ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T
by construction, as do firm 2’s stopping times τ2F (ϑ) = inf{t ≥ ϑ |xt ≥ x2F }.
To verify the equilibrium at ϑ ∈ T by Corollary 3.7, note that now piL1· −pi01· ≥ piL2· −pi02· ,
whence problem (3.6) is solved by τ2D(ϑ′) = τS(ϑ) ∨ ϑ′. Thus we have an equilibrium if
x1L ≥ x1F (≥ x¯) or, using the strong Markov property, if 0 ≥ DS(x) := L20 − E
[
F 2τS(0)
]
given
x0 = x ∈ [x1L, x1F ).
By Proposition 3.6, if x1L < x1F and we let τ(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 |xt ≥ x} ≤ τ1F (0) for any
x ∈ [x1L, x1F ), then DS(x1L) ≥ E
[
L2τ(x) − F 2τS(0)
]
= E[DS(x)], where the last identity is due
to xτ(x) = x. Therefore it remains to verify DS(x1L) ≤ 0 for x1L < x1F , i.e., x1L 6∈ (¯x, x¯). Thelatter condition is (cf. equations (8), (9) in Pawlina and Kort (2006), accounting for possibly
x1F = x2F =∞)
DS(x1L) =
x1LD10
r − µ − I
2 − x
1
F (D10 −D11)
r − µ
(
x1L
x1F
)β1
− x
1
LD01
r − µ −
(
x2F (D11 −D01)
r − µ − I
2
)(
x1L
x2F
)β1
= β1
β1 − 1
I1
D10 −D01
D10 −D00
− I2 − β1
β1 − 1
I1
D10 −D11
D10 −D00
((D11 −D01)+
D10 −D00
)β1−1
− 1
β1 − 1
I2
(
I1
I2
(D11 −D01)+
D10 −D00
)β1
!≤ 0.
Rearranging yields the condition (4.7). The derivative of its LHS w.r.t. I2/I1 is strictly
positive for x1L < x1F given β1 > 1, because then (D11−D00)+/(D10−D00) < 1. By the same
fact the RHS of (4.7) is strictly positive.
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To show necessity of x1L 6∈ (¯x, x¯), suppose the contrary, whence x
1
L < x
1
F and DS(x1L) > 0
by definition. For any x ≤ x1L,
DS(x) = E
[
DS(x1L)
]
+ L20 − E
[
L2τS(0)
]
= DS(x1L) + E
[∫ τS(0)
0
(piL2s − pi02s ) ds
]
= DS(x1L) +
x(D10 −D00)
r − µ − I
2 − x
1
L(D10 −D00)
r − µ
(
x
x1L
)β1
,
which converges continuously toDS(x1L) > 0 as x→ x1L. ThusDS(x) > 0 for some x < x1L.
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